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Witness and Lawyer in the Roman courts.
Linguistic strategies of evasiveness and intimidation in Roman trial debates.
Roman courts were a venue where Latin was spoken in a variety of situational con-
texts and registers. Firstly, there must have been a series of legal formulas and perfor-
matives (e.g. oaths) uttered by the president of the court or his clerks, as well as lawyers 
and witnesses; then came the fully-fledged orations (orationes perpetuae) pronounced 
by counsel, which were a mixture of formal prose recited from a memorized script and 
improvised, extempore phrases1. Finally, there was the questioning of witnesses. Scraps 
of heated exchange between lawyers (altercatio) have been preserved: these were either 
occasioned as objections to cross-questioning or took the form of extemporaneous in-
terruptions and caustic comments in the opposing counsel’s speech2.
The Latin of lawyers, the ‘orators’, was expected to represent a standard, prestige va-
riety, and was under intense scrutiny in this respect: Cicero, in his survey of the his-
tory of Latin eloquence in Brutus, shows that brilliant legal thinking was not enough 
to be regarded as a first-class barrister, and was regarded as flawed if counsel spoke the 
wrong, provincial variety of Latin (oppidani)3. In another passage, Cicero describes 
some old-fashioned speech habits of a previous generation of lawyers, exhibiting fea-
tures which, to contemporary Roman ears, appeared ‘uneducated’4. Gellius likewise 
1 Cf. Quint. inst. XI 2,47 memoria autem facit etiam prompti ingeni famam, ut illa quae dici-
mus non domo attulisse sed ibi protinus sumpsisse uideamur, [...] idque in actionibus inter praecipua 
seruandum est, ut quaedam etiam quae optime uinximus uelut soluta enuntiemus, et cogitantibus 
nonnumquam et dubitantibus similes quaerere uideamur quae attulimus. Cicero and other fa-
mous orators published their speeches after the trial; during the process they seem to have taken 
with them only rough notes and memos (commentaria), perhaps along the lines of the so-called 
‘narratio’ (or better: νομικός) documents found in some papyri (for an updated bibliography on 
the problem see the entry for P. Col. 7.174 at http://papyri.info/ddbdp/p.col;7;174).
2 On altercatio cf. Powell 2009, 29-31. 
3 In a similar vein, Quintilian recommends avoidance of regional vocabulary and technical 
expressions (ie precise words used by a specific profession, typically used to designate a precise 
tool, Fallunt etiam uerba uel regionibus quibusdam magis familiaria uel artium propria, ut ‘atabu-
lus’ uentus et nauis ‘stlataria’ et †inmalocosanum [...] VIII 2,13). ‘Provincial’ Latin in this context 
is discussed in Adams 2007, 135, with references: Quintilian also mentions the same Piacenza 
lawyer criticised in Cicero’s Brutus, Tinca, who said precula for pergula.
4 Cic. de orat. III 46 Qua re Cotta noster, cuius tu illa lata, Sulpici, non numquam imitaris, ut 
Iota litteram tollas et E plenissimum dicas, non mihi oratores antiquos, sed messores uidetur imitari.’ 
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records interesting derogatory remarks on lawyers naively showing off obsolete or over-
ly technical Latin. Their aim was to impress a jury or an audience but they were easy 
game for an unsympathetic judge or for an opposing counsel ready to seize the chance5. 
On a different plane, Quintilian dwells on lawyers’ need for effective communication, 
a goal attained more securely by deploying clipped and pithy phrases with straightfor-
ward word-order and precise choice of vocabulary, rather than by resorting, for example, 
to long hyperbata appropriate for writing elegant prose, but lost on judges selected by 
drawing lots and non-professional6.
Ancient Roman sources are thus replete with metalinguistic comment on lawyers’ 
Latin and their command of different registers, or lack thereof. In this paper, however, I 
intend to dwell mostly on the evidence regarding the interaction between participants 
in a court debate; in particular I will focus on the questioning of witnesses by counsel or, 
in the inquisitorial system of late antiquity, by the presiding magistrate.
In introducing the following evidence, I will be adapting methodological insights 
and vocabulary from linguistic pragmatics, especially the emphasis on speech acts and 
interactional talk. For example, the study of extant counsel-witness exchanges will show 
the deployment of various politeness strategies, typically with a hidden motive (for ex-
ample when an advocate is trying to lead the witness to make a statement contradicting a 
previous assertion). Similarly, witnesses and defendants often adopt politeness strategies 
while trying to elude an opposing counsel, without being too obvious and without being 
patently offensive. Also typical of dialogic interaction in court is the importance of a 
precise power and authority hierarchy overseeing exchange between the different par-
ticipants: only counsel and judges can ask questions, and they choose the form in which 
their queries are couched, which they do with array of intimidating strategies.
5 Another interesting source of court debate or extemporaneous bantering is Gellius, 
usually in connection with the use of inappropriate, far-fetched or obsolete Latin expressions 
by counsel, who is being rebuked by a presiding judge, as on I 22 se superesse, XV 5 profligata, XI 
7 bouinator. It is usually unclear at what point the judge intervenes to comment on the lawyer’s 
expression, but presumably in the introductory speech, not during questioning, assuming there 
are witnesses. XI 7 is pronounced when counsel objects to a request for adjournment. In a similar 
vein also Cic. Brut. 260 in which counsel Rusius objects to Sisenna’s using unclear language: 
quo accusante C. Hirtilium Sisenna defendens dixit quaedam eius sputatilica esse crimina. tum C. 
Rusius: ‘circumuenior, inquit, iudices, nisi subuenitis. Sisenna quid dicat nescio; metuo insidias. 
sputatilica, quid est hoc? sputa quid sit scio, tilica nescio.’ maxumi risus.
6 VIII 2,14 ... nec sit tam longus ut eum prosequi non possit intentio, nec †transiectio intra mo-
dum hyperbato  finis eius differatur. VIII 6,65 ... uitanda est etiam illa Sallustiana (quamquam in 
ipso uirtutis optinet locum) breuitas et abruptum sermonis genus: quod otiosum fortasse lectorem 
minus fallat, audientem transuolat, nec dum repetatur expectat, cum praesertim lector non fere sit 
nisi eruditus, iudicem rura plerumque in decurias mittant de eo pronuntiaturum quod intellexerit. 
Language in the Roman couRts
- 59 -
There are of course great differences between the study of ancient and of modern evi-
dence in this perspective. Modern linguists can use accurate court records; they can even 
produce their own transcripts from tape recordings, in which many suprasegmental fea-
tures of the spoken language are encoded, such as intonation, pace, pitch. Comparable 
evidence from the Roman courts does not exist, as no ‘tight’ transcriptions can be pro-
duced, and what does exist is of course discontinuous and much less abundant. Court 
transcripts, at least in Cicero’s time, seem to have been rather loose, mostly summaries 
of what was said rather than uerbatim transcriptions of the way in which participants 
spoke, though the later evidence shows progress towards a more accurate reproduction 
of the exact words7. Written depositions were part of court acts, and were available, as 
well as widely used, for example by Cicero. They are normally in indirect speech form, 
but there is evidence that, from the age of Cicero, reports started to be handed down in 
oratio recta.
The evidence transmitted by Cicero in treatises and orations comes in two main 
shapes: comments on what a previous speaker has said (in the orations) and anecdotes, 
for examples humorous recollections of a lively, momentous exchange between coun-
sel or between counsel and witness. Cicero has also left us some fictional recreations 
of dialogue between counsel and defendant or witness in his orations, sometimes as a 
personal relay of what he claims has taken place on a previous session, sometimes just as 
a hypothetical reconstruction. Although by definition biased, these sketches are useful 
to highlight the tactics and, more generally, the linguistic behaviour of lawyers and wit-
nesses during questioning and to show how lawyers succeeded in driving home a point8.
In the later period, from the fourth century onwards, reporting seems to have become 
more accurate, and by chance some full transcripts are extant. I will be drawing on the 
Gesta Zenophili, the Acta purgationis Felicis episcopi, and the Collatio Carthaginiensis, in 
addition to using sparse evidence from Egyptian papyri of the Roman period9. 
7 Coles 1966, 10-12 on the earliest evidence regarding oratio recta and short-hand in acta 
about the time of Cicero’s consulship in 63.
8 In general, however, Cicero tends to sum up a witness’ deposition, not report the precise 
words, or only briefly. As perceptively put by Ps. Asconius, In Actionem primam contra Verrem 
enarratio, 56, p. 223 Stangl, the actual words spoken by witnesses would not be appropriate for 
the style requirements of a published oration: inducentur enim dehinc a Tullio testes, quorum 
uerba in oratione conscribere nullius elegantiae fuit.
9 The two most interesting late-antique documents I will be drawing on are the Gesta apud 
Zenophilum and the Acta purgationis Felicis. They are transmitted in a single MS containing the 
work of Optatus Mileuitanus, Paris, BNF, Lat. 1711: although often corrupt, both texts provide 
interesting evidence, both under the aspect of the Latin used by the participants and under the 
viewpoint of legal history. These texts are sometimes discussed by historians, e.g. Mayer 2008, 
244-6 or Shaw 2011, 76-7, but are all but unknown to Latin language historians. The Acta Felicis 
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1. Aliquo circumitu
A great deal of interesting linguistic comment on the manner of the confrontation 
between questioning lawyer and witness is found in rhetorical authors, most of all 
Quintilian, who in Book 5 of the Institutio dwells on the different categories of witness-
es and the recommended approach to each of them. The section is interesting also for a 
number of metaphors, often deriving from such spheres as the military, hunting or ath-
letic competitions (for instance in laqueos, in gradum componere, subici ab aduersario).
Quintilian starts from the different treatment to be meted out to friendly and hos-
tile witnesses. Friendly witnesses can be trained beforehand on what to say and how to 
say it. Some of them may be driven by resentment against the defendant; others will 
be known by counsel as intending to lie to the court. The latter category is the riskiest, 
not because of the moral dilemma facing a lawyer who intends to use their testimony 
(during the Republican and early Imperial periods lawyers appear to have had less com-
punction about misleading the court in the interest of their clients), but because witness 
statements are intrinsically slippery, if not utterly inconsistent, or because they may have 
a last minute change of mind, or even, given their shaky morals, end up conniving with 
the other side. The prosecuting lawyer had the right to enforce a deposition, but some 
of these witnesses were often obviously hostile or recalcitrant in their depositions. It 
was therefore commonly felt that Counsel should try to extract the usable statement by 
some circuitous, oblique way (aliquo circumitu ad id peruenire, ut illi quod maxime dice-
re uoluit uideatur expressum), so that the witness would not notice that the lawyer’s truth 
was being extorted (extorquere, exprimere). The concept was that questions must come 
from far away, so as to deceive the witness on the stand and catch him unprepared: he 
must be questioned on the antefact, the ensuing facts, the time, the places, the people 
until he is tripped up by something and is forced to admit what the barrister wants him 
to (multa de ante actis, multa de insecutis, loco tempore persona ceteris est interrogandus, 
ut in aliquod responsum incidat post quod illi uel fateri quae uolumus necesse sit uel iis 
describe a session in court held in the year 314 CE in Carthage. The defendant was one Alfius 
Caecilianus, an ex-duovir who in the town of Aptungi had been charged with conniving with 
bishop Felix to appropriate Christian books instead of burning them as Diocletian had de-
creed. In the earlier of the two Felix trials, the prosecutor was a barrister, Maximus, acting on 
behalf of the local Christian clergy (the seniores), Donatist Christians who wanted to use the 
occasion to throw discredit on the Catholics. In the second trial, held in 314 CE, in which the 
prosecution was led by one Apronianus, a number of earlier documents were read. The Gesta 
apud Zenophilum are the transcript of another trial held in 320 CE, at Cirta: here a Catholic 
clergyman, Nundinarius, prosecuted Silvanus, a bishop who had bribed the community to 
elect him bishop and in the course of so doing had appropriated money which was to be dis-
tributed among the poor.
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quae iam dixerit repugnare). Quintilian goes on to say that no instruction can be im-
parted on how to become a successful and skillful interrogator, but the best precedent 
is that of Socrates in Plato’s dialogues, in which he has always managed to extract from 
his interlocutors, no matter how reluctant, the conclusions he had intended to reach 
from the start.
Quintilian also warns against the pitfalls and lures of lawyer’s pompous and high 
register language, often skating on thin ice with the risk of falling prey to his own super-
ciliousness. Alert witnesses are not weaponless against wily barristers, and in fact some 
are ready to grasp their chance when a lawyer has lost the thread of his own argument by 
using pompous language: there is nothing so likely to stem the flow of lawyer’s rhetoric 
as a justified ‘I don’t understand’(inst. V 7,32)10.
Metaphorical language similar to Quintilian’s that portrays the attitude of a 
cross-questioning barrister comes from Cicero’s Pro Flacco 22:
(1) Cic. Flacc. 22 Vbi est igitur illa laus oratoris quae uel in accusatore antea uel in 
patrono spectari solebat: «bene testem interrogauit; callide accessit, reprehendit; 
quo uoluit adduxit; conuicit et elinguem reddidit?».
Where, then, is the oratorical skill, which formerly used to be looked for either in 
the prosecutor or in the counsel for the defence? «He examined the witness clev-
erly; he came up to him cunningly; he scolded him; he led him where he pleased; 
he convicted him and made him dumb».
The passage sums up, in the words of the audience at an untypical trial, the expected 
behaviour of the cross-questioning counsel in the adversarial debate: scolding, laying 
traps, leading, until the witness is literally lost for words in the end.
Juries and, later, ruling judges listened to and were influenced not only by the wit-
nesses’ spoken words but also by their general appearance, social condition, and presum-
ably also by their confidence, self-assurance, and control of language. This comes to the 
fore explicitly in a set of instructions issued by the Imperial chancery to ruling judges:
(2) Dig. XLVII 18,10,5 Plurimum quoque in excutienda ueritate etiam uox 
ipsa et cognitionis suptilis diligentia adfert: nam et ex sermone et ex eo, qua quis 
constantia, qua trepidatione quid diceret, uel cuius existimationis quisque in 
ciuitate sua est, quaedam ad inluminandam ueritatem in lucem emergunt.
10 Sed in primis interrogatio cum debet esse circumspecta, quia multa contra patronos uenuste tes-
tes saepe respondent eique praecipue rei uulgo fauetur, tum uerbis quam maxime ex medio sumptis, 
ut qui rogatur (is autem saepius est imperitus) intellegat, aut ne intellegere se neget, quod interro-
gantis non leue frigus est.
Rolando FeRRi
- 62 -
In investigating the truth, important clues are the voice (of the witness or defen-
dant) and a careful study of the evidence. Indeed, much (lit. some) light is shed 
on the truth of the matter by how firmly and consistently a deposition is made, or 
on the contrary by the agitation of the witness and the good or bad estimation in 
which he is held in his town.
2. Acting up the counter-interrogating counsel
From a slightly later period, Donatus’ commentary of Terence transmits information 
about the manner of a cross-interrogating lawyer in a series of notes on Eunuchus, in a 
passage where Phaedria, the older of two brothers, interrogates the eunuch Dorio ‘in 
the manner of lawyers adopting circuitous interrogation tactics’ (see infra). A servant of 
Thais, Pythias, has come out of the house calling out for help after the girl in Thais’ care 
has been raped by the eunuch donated by Phaedria as a token of devotion to her. The 
true author of the rape is in actual fact Chaerea, Phaedria’s younger brother, who, in love 
with the girl, had sneaked into the house in disguise, wearing the eunuch’s clothes, un-
beknownst to everyone else. But as far as the servants of Thais know, a eunuch is the per-
petrator: hence the equivocation. But when Dorio, the falsely incriminated real eunuch, 
reveals that Chaerea had taken his clothes, Phaedria, gasping at the truth, attempts to 
cover up his brother by questioning Dorio’s reliability in the manner of a defence coun-
sel (here orator) cross-questioning a witness (testis):
(3) Don. Comm. Eun. 700 vnde igitvr evm fratrem mevm esse sciebas 
[...] hae sunt obliquae interrogationes, quibus uti oratores uidemus, cum deri-
uare testimonium nituntur et ideo sic ait Phaedria, ut frustretur omnia, quae 
confessus est Dorio: uult enim fratri esse consultum. Parmeno dicebat evm 
esse prope infirmatum est testimonium: quod enim Parmeno dicebat eum 
esse, potest falsum esse. 705 credis hvic qvod dicit a personae qualitate 
derogat fidem; nam quid credendum est seruo eunucho fugitiuo? qvid isti 
credam res ipsa indicat haec a persona quae conuincebatur oratorie ad 
factum se rettulit. 712 hevs negato rvrsvm ‘rursum’ non ad ‘negato’ per-
tinet, sed ad interrogationem, ut sit: ‘rursus interrogo te’. 713 non potest 
sine malo fateri video ampliatio quaestionis argumentum est nihil consti-
tisse. adde quod poenam minatur non tamquam iam incerto sed iam falso testi. 
deinde ipsum ‘fateri’ consideremus quale sit: non est testis, sed rei. hic igitur ut 
in illum culpam transferat uniuersam, ‘fateri’ dixit, non ‘indicare’, ut ipse reus, 
non alieni facti testis esse dicatur. [...] 714 modo ait modo negat testis aut 
ab aduersario conuincitur falsitatis aut a se ipso, si uariauerit dicta. ergo priora 
quia non potuerant conuinci, ab inconstantia testis praesidium defensionis est 
inquisitum.
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700 «How did you know then that he was my brother»[...] these are the 
indirect forms of questions we see lawyers using when they attempt to weaken 
a testimony. Thus Phaedria’s mode of speech is designed to make everything 
Dorio states seem devoid of foundation, Phaedria being determined, in this 
context, to shield his own brother. «Parmeno said it was him»: Dorio’s 
deposition risks being undermined, for what Parmeno said may well be false. 
705 «do you believe what he says?» (Phaedria) weakens Dorio’s credibility 
on the basis of a social element: how can you trust a slave, a eunuch, a fugitive? 
«the very thing that happened tells me why I must believe him». The speaker 
(Pythias) moves from the unreliability of the speaker to the undeniability of the 
event, with rhetorical ability. 712 «Hey you, deny (everything)- and again»: 
the word rursum does not go with negato, but leads to the next question, as if it 
were «let me ask you again». 713 «he cannot be induced to confess without 
some form of punishment». The adjournment of the interrogation is proof that 
the witness gave an inconsistent account. To this should be added that Phaedria 
threatens the witness, not because the latter has given inadequate evidence, but 
in order to unmask him as a liar. If we then look at fateri, the verb refers to the 
witness, not to the fact. Phaedria uses this word instead of indicare, ‘explain’, 
because he is attempting to shift all the blame onto Dorio, so as to make him 
appear to be the defendant rather than the witness in someone else’s suit. [...] 
714 «He says now one thing, now the opposite». A witness is shown to be 
a liar either by the opponent or by some false step, if he makes inconsistent 
statements. Thus, since Phaedria was unable to deny the facts (ie that the girl 
was raped), he is trying to find a line of defence in the way in which the witness 
contradicts himself11.
The passage is interesting because the legal implications of the passage are all of 
Donatus’ doing: Donatus talks to an audience of would-be legal speakers and highlights 
what would be interesting to them, and perhaps what he had been taught to see as rele-
vant. Phaedria’s confounding of the unfortunate Dorio is therefore portrayed as a scene 
from a court drama, with Phaedria acting out the cross-questioning unscrupulous law-
yer and trying to cover up his brother’s crime. Phaedria starts first by trying to show that 
Dorio’s evidence is flawed: how did Dorio know it was Chaerea who took his clothes, 
if he had never ever set eye on Chaerea (Dorio is a recent purchase?); Donatus then 
stresses the weakness of Dorio’s answer, based on hearsay (Parmeno was saying that it was 
him). Phaedria then attempts an aggression a qualitate, very much as Cicero does quite 
often for non élite witnesses on the stand (a servant cannot give reliable evidence), after 
which he attempts to show that Dorio is giving contradictory depositions - and this of 
11 An important translation into French of the entire commentary of Donatus is now avail-
able online, at the url http://hyperdonat.tge-adonis.fr/editions/html/corpus.html, Bureau et al. 
2007-2011.
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course is exactly what Dorio is doing because he has now realized that he is incriminat-
ing his master’s brother and will suffer badly if he persists doing so.
3. Rogo, quaero, postulo
Our evidence does not allow us to fill all the gaps in our knowlege of procedural 
rules and trial etiquette. But it is evident that some form of ritual behaviour, certainly 
evolving over time, was thought to be acceptable, even though trial procedures were 
certainly more informal than the highly ritualized procedures in iure, where everything 
was conducted according to the stiff system of the formular system12.
During trial sessions, counsel called his own witnesses and cross-questioned those of 
the other side. It is likely that he asked for permission to do so, as shown by Cicero, De 
oratore II 245:
(4) Cic. de orat. II 245,3 Pusillus testis processit. «Licet - inquit - rogare?» 
Philippus. Tum quaesitor properans «modo breuiter». Hic ille «non accusabis: 
perpusillum rogabo».
In this case, Cicero conjures up the scene in direct speech, portraying the word-play 
that revolves around an infelicitous joke (hinging on the ambiguity of perpusillum that 
can mean both ‘a very short time’ and ‘a very short one’, said of a witness of low height, a 
typical snide comment much favored by lawyers, referring to the physical appearance of 
the witness). But, as Cicero says, the judge too was a short man, and he took offence at the 
remark. What emerges from the passage, however, is that counsel asked the president’s 
permission to start his questioning – presumably cross-questioning – and the judge in 
this case grudgingly allowed it (presumably he could deny it, in certain contexts).
In another passage, a lawyer asks for permission to digress from the immediate issues 
of the case, which prompted the judge to give a caustic response:
(5) Gell. I 22,6 Memini ego praetoris, docti hominis, tribunali me forte assiste-
re atque ibi aduocatum non incelebrem sic postulare, ut extra causam diceret 
remque, quae agebatur, non attingeret13.
12 Gaius relates several forms of performative expressions uttered by the claimants and the 
defendants during the phase in iure following the procedure of the legis actiones or even in the 
per formulas procedure before the pretor. Among many examples, cf. Gaius, inst. IV 17b (fixed 
phrases pronounced to initiate an actio per condictionem), or the description of the ritual accom-
panying the legis actio sacramento at IV 16.
13 postulo is a stronger expression for requests, so perhaps Gellius is not reproducing the exact 
wording of the speaker’s speech act.
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On the available evidence, we ignore to what extent, if any, a judge would cut in on a 
cross-questioning lawyer, either reacting to an objection (see infra), or seeking to shield a 
witness from intimidation. From the later period, however, we have evidence that ‘lead-
ing’ questions were to be avoided:
(6) Dig. XLVIII 18,1,21 Qui quaestionem habiturus est, non debet specialiter 
interrogare, an Lucius Titius homicidium fecerit, sed generaliter, quis id fecerit: 
alterum enim magis suggerentis quam requirentis uidetur. 
The judge who is interrogating a witness is not to ask specifically if Lucius Titius 
committed a murder, but in general terms, who did that. For the former appears 
to be a suggestion, not a real question.
Passage (4) is interesting also because it preserves the performative verb used in ques-
tioning a witness on the stand, rogare (licet... rogare?). Other extracts from Cicero seem 
to imply that the formula leading to the question was te rogo, used as a performative to 
stress the institutional situation in which the interlocutor is formally obliged to answer 
the question: 
(7) Cic. Flacc. 22-3 Quid tu istum roges, Laeli, qui, prius quam hoc «Te rogo» 
dixeris, plura etiam effundet quam tu ei domi ante praescripseris? Quid ego 
autem defensor rogem?
What questions can you ask, Laelius, a man who, even before you have pro-
nounced the words «I hereby ask you», will pour out more assertions than you 
enjoined him before you left home?
In another passage reporting (in fact, inventing) a cross-questioning scene, Cicero 
uses the same phrase as a coda capping his question, presumably for the specific purpose 
of stressing his attitude as claiming a precise response (rather than ‘I’m asking *you*, as 
opposed to anyone else):
(8) Cic. Quinct. 79 Quam longe est hinc in saltum uestrum Gallicanum? Naeui, 
te rogo.
Here, even if the exchange is fictional, not a real record, Cicero caps the question 
with te rogo as a performative, to mark his speech act and its peremptory nature. An 
answer is expected, indeed required of Naevius.
Rogo in requests has recently been studied in great detail by Dickey, 2012, who con-
clusively shows that rogo and peto are associated with major requests in Classical Latin 
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(while minor requests are formulated with uelim and quaeso). Rogo, soon after Cicero, 
or perhaps already in his time, became the parenthetical expression used for ‘please’, in 
time ousting quaeso and earlier expressions (Cf. Dickey 2006). According to Dickey 
2012, 745, «rogo, which is entirely absent from Cicero’s speeches [...], belongs exclusive-
ly to a more informal register when used with requests». However, a sharp distinction 
between the meanings ‘to ask someone a question’ and ‘to request’ is not easy to main-
tain, and is further confused by adoption of the same ut construction, for example in 
such phrases as rogo ut mihi respondeas. But even if the distinction were acceptable, dis-
tribution and register definition in Cicero do not match Dickey’s description exactly. In 
the speeches Cicero is not normally in a position to put forward major requests for him-
self, so first-person rogo indicating requests does not occur (only «I hereby ask you»). 
However, Cicero has rogamus at Cluent. 195 and rogabimus at Font. 36 in requests ad-
dressed to the jury on behalf of his client and in a closing argument14. Moreover, in the 
third person, rogat occurs frequently even in the speeches, often paired with orat, when 
Cicero describes requests by third parties. None of these occurrences suggest informali-
ty, in fact the opposite, contextually (addressing the jury, combination with oro), seems 
to be the case. I would thus suggest limiting the informality/formality categorization to 
the opposition between an unconstrued rogo as a parenthetical for ‘please’ and its use 
in complete phrases, which must have soon become formal and old-fashioned not long 
after Cicero’s time (exactly the situation in modern English with please/if it please you, 
with the latter almost exclusively used ironically because too old-fashioned)15.
Be this as it may, one wonders how the use of rogo as a lawyer’s performative fits 
Dickey’s convincing analysis of requests in a politeness scale. In the context of a court-
room situation, the defendant or witness is obliged to answer, and the advocate is not 
expected to go on record as having benefited from the answer: the ‘pleading/urgent’ nu-
ance associated with rogo-requests elsewhere is relevant in a different way, and it seems 
better to see rogo not as a marker of polite but rather of formal, ritualized language 
(unlike other cases in which lawyers feign politeness to make a witness lower his or her 
guard) marking aloofness and peremptoriness16.
14 Cic. Cluen. 195 uos ne huius honestissime actam uitam matris crudelitati condonetis rogamus; 
Cic. Font. 36 orandus erit nobis amicus meus, M. Plaetorius, ut suos nouos clientis a bello faciendo deter-
reat [...], aut, si non poterit, M. Fabium, subscriptorem eius, rogabimus ut Allobrogum animos mitiget.
15 It is difficult to associate rogo with informality, whatever its meaning, considering the 
phrase rogare sententiam used when casting a vote in political meetings, and because of the for-
mal contexts in trial procedures, and in will formulas reported in the Digest, which make the 
perception of register less well-defined.
16 Rogatum is also the term used to refer to the question posed by counsel. Cicero himself refers 
to the act of questioning a witness by interrogo, presumably a clearer and more specific replacement. 
Zumpt 1871, 335 argues that interrogo referred to cross-questioning, but the evidence is very thin.
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Cicero also has quaero to introduce his question to a witness, in this case the hated 
Vatinius, in this extract of what seems to be a fragment of his actual words during cross-
questioning:
(9) Cic. Vatin. 42 hoc quaero, num P. Sestium, qua lege accusandum omnino fu-
isse negas, ea lege condemnari putes oportere? 
I ask this; - whether you think that Publius Sestius ought to be condemned ac-
cording to the provisions of a law under which you say that he never ought to 
have been accused at all? 
 
It is not easy to see why quaero is used here in preference to rogo, but perhaps it is 
because there is no personal pronoun construction and because Cicero is placing greater 
emphasis on the elaborate point he is making, with the casuistic distinction between 
quem... condemnandum... negas and condemnari putes oportere (apparently Vatinius, 
who deposed against Sestius, had been reported as saying that Sestius «ought not» to 
be accused under the statute de ui – but only because it would be difficult to bring about 
a conviction on the available evidence, not because Sestius had not committed what he 
was charged with: of course Cicero chooses to stress only the first half of the statement).
In other passages, rogo and quaero are used without obvious meaning or register dif-
ferences, as in the following narrative of Cicero’s interrogation of Heius, a witness sum-
moned by Cicero to testify against Verres17: 
(10) Cic. Verr. II 4,27 cum quaesissem numquid aliud de bonis eius peruenisset ad 
Verrem, respondit istum ad se misisse ut sibi mitteret Agrigentum peripetasma-
ta. quaesiui eane misisset; respondit id quod necesse erat, scilicet: dicto audien-
tem fuisse praetori, misisse. rogaui peruenissentne Agrigentum; dixit peruenisse. 
quaesiui quemadmodum reuertissent; negauit adhuc reuertisse. risus populi 
atque admiratio omnium uestrum facta est.
17 Other passages showing that rogo had a technical currency in the law courts for ‘in-
terrogate’ and rogatum for a lawyer’s questioning are Cic. de orat. II 303 mihi turpius uideri 
nihil solet, quam quod ex oratoris dicto aliquo aut responso aut rogato sermo ille sequitur: 
«occidit». «Aduersariumne?». «Immo uero -  aiunt - se et eum, quem defendit». and Cic. 
Verr. II 1,84 Cedo mihi ipsius Verris testimonium: uideamus quid idem iste iuratus dixerit. 
Recita. Ab accusatore rogatus respondit in hoc iudicio non persequi: sibi in animo esse alio 
tempore persequi. Let us see what that fellow said on his oath. Recite it. «Being asked by 
the accuser, he answered that he was not prosecuting for that in this trial, that he intended 
to prosecute for that another time», In Vatinium testem interrogatio 40.
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When I asked, whether any other part of his property had come to Verres, he 
answered that he had sent him orders to send the tapestry to Agrigentum to him. 
I asked whether he had sent it. He replied as he must, that is, that he had been 
obedient to the praetor; that he had sent it. - I asked whether it had arrived at 
Agrigentum; he said it had arrived. - I asked in what condition it had returned; he 
said it had not returned yet. - There was a laugh and a murmur from all the people.
Most forceful of all verbs for conducting an interrogation is postulo, as used in Cic. 
Verr. II 2,188-9 where Cicero describes his cornering of one of Verres’ associates, the 
banker Carpinatius, who had falsified his registers to hide payments made to Verres:
(11) Cic. Verr. II 2,188-9 postulo ut mihi respondeat qui sit is Verrucius, mercator 
an negotiator an arator an pecuarius, in Sicilia sit an iam decesserit. clamare 
omnes ex conuentu neminem umquam in Sicilia fuisse Verrucium. ego instare ut 
mihi responderet, quis esset, ubi esset, unde esset; cur seruus societatis qui tabulas 
conficeret, semper in Verruci nomine certo ex loco mendosus esset. atque haec 
postulabam non quo illum cogi putarem oportere, ut ad ea mihi responderet 
inuitus, sed ut omnibus istius furta, illius flagitium, utriusque audacia perspicua 
esse posset. itaque illum in iure metu conscientiaque peccati mutum atque 
exanimatum ac uix uiuum relinquo.
I demand that Carpinatius shall give me an answer as to who that Verrutius is; 
whether he is a merchant, or a broker, or an agriculturist, or a grazier; whether he 
is in Sicily, or whether he has now left it. All who were in the court cried out at 
once that there had never been anyone in Sicily of the name of Verrutius. I began 
to press the man to answer me and say who he was, where he was, whence he came; 
why the servant of the company who made up the accounts always made a blunder 
in the name of Verrutius at the same place? And I made this demand, not because I 
thought it of any consequence that he should be compelled to answer me on these 
points against his will, but that the robberies of one, the dishonesty of the other, 
and the audacity of both might be made evident to all the world. And so I leave 
him in the court, dumb from fear and the consciousness of his crimes, terrified out 
of his wits, and almost frightened to death.
In two passages in Cicero, a reluctant or evasive witness is summoned to answer the 
question with ad rogata responde:
(12) Vatin. 40 Sed ut aliquando audiamus quam copiose mihi ad rogata 
respondeas, concludam iam interrogationem meam teque in extremo pauca de 
ipsa causa rogabo. 
But that we may hear at length how fully you reply to my interrogations, I will 
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now conclude my examination of you, and at the end I will ask you a few ques-
tions relating to the cause itself.
In later documents describing judicial or near-judicial procedures18, as we are going 
to see, Republican Latin responde quod rogo is substituted by responde quod interrogo, 
perhaps because rogo had become common for parenthetic ‘please’ or for more pleading, 
major requests, almost ‘to beg’, or ‘to pray’, and a more precise or technical term was 
needed: 
(13) Gesta concilii Aquileiensis, 34 Palladius dixit: «Ego quae interrogo non 
respondetis?».
(14) Gesta collationis Carthaginiensis. Cognitio 3,199 Augustinus, episcopus ec-
clesiae catholicae, dixit: «ergo ad interrogata respondete».
(15) Gesta collationis Carthaginiensis. ibid. Receditis a criminibus traditionis? 
respondeant ad breue interrogatum nostrum.
(16) Gesta collationis Carthaginiensis. Cognitio 3,246 Marcellinus, uir clarissimus, 
tribunus et notarius, dixit: «ad interrogata respondere dignare».
(17) Acta purgationis Felicis p. 201, 12 Ziwsa: Aelianus proconsul dixit: «Quoniam 
fingis te non intelligere quod interrogaris, dicam apertius».
Aelianus: «Since you pretend not to understand the question you’re being asked, 
I will repeat it more clearly».
The technical expression for ‘answering the question’ in the form ad interrogatum 
respondere occurs in the following extract from the Digest dealing with inheritance cases 
(the Digest, though a collection of extraordinary interest for linguistic reasons as well, is 
18 A significant lapse of time separates evidence culled from Cicero and evidence from pa-
pyri and gesta, but the diachronic element does not seem to be crucial. More important is the 
evolution of administrative and legal procedures from the Republican to the Imperial periods, 
and particularly the change from the procedures of the quaestiones perpetuae, standing courts 
dealing with specific charges or types of crimes, active in the Republican period, to the cognitio 
extra ordinem of the Imperial period. The main difference lies with the presence, in the quaestio 
trials, or non-professional juries and the adherence to what appears to be a system similar to the 
adversarial Common Law procedure, for Cicero, whereas in the Imperial period a trial is presid-
ed over solely by an imperial administrator, in varying degrees of importance (from prefect to 
local magistrate or community official), who leads the investigative and judicial procedure, with 
the lawyers assuming a relatively more contained role. 
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less revealing under the viewpoint of trial language because it is a collection of, mostly, 
civil law commentaries):
(18) Dig. XI 1,10,5 De interrogatoriis actionibus Quod autem ait praetor «om-
nino non respondisse», posteriores sic exceperunt, ut omnino non respondisse 
videatur, qui ad interrogatum non respondit, id est πρὸς ἔπος. 
Concerning the praetor’s phrase «he did not answer at all», later interpreters 
read this as meaning that he who did not answer exactly according to the tenor of 
the question, that is, ‘word for word’, is said not to have given an answer. 
(19) Dig. XI 1,9,5 Qui interrogatus heredem se responderit nec adiecerit ex qua 
parte, ex asse respondisse dicendum est, nisi forte ita interrogetur, an ex dimidia 
parte heres sit, et responderit ‘heres sum’: hic enim magis eum puto ad interroga-
tum respondisse.
he who when the question was put to him answered that he was the heir, but did 
not specify for what fraction, must be taken to have answered in toto, unless the 
question put to him was explicit, if he was heir to the half estate, and he answered 
‘I am’. In this case I think he rather gave a precise answer. 
More generally, in later court proceedings, performatives are less in evidence, be-
cause trial and court procedures had fundamentally altered. The adversarial system 
of the Republican period had changed to an inquisitorial system, in which the judge 
conducted the interrogation, and counsel could only address the court, not the wit-
ness, although they could and did feed the judge with possible questions. Whereas the 
Republican advocate needed to reassert his position as an authorized questioner, the 
Imperial judge wielded unchallenged authority: for example, he could order that a wit-
ness be beaten or tortured, and he had perhaps less need of deploying such performative 
expressions19. Therefore the greater power wielded by the presiding judge while ques-
tioning must be the reason why in the Gesta apud Zenophilum, and the Acta purgatio-
nis Felicis, or the Gesta collationis Carthaginiensis rogo and quaero as performatives are 
not present. Questions are suggested by the advocates to the judge, who then addresses 
the witness. The only verb used is the clearer interrogo, next to quaero, but only for de-
scribing the questioning in abstract terms or for describing actual questions: first-person 
performatives marking the witness’s speaking turn (de hoc te rogo and such like) do not 
occur in these later documents. 
In the following extracts, Apronianus, acting as advocate on behalf of Caecilianus, an 
19Flacc. 10 numquam nobis ad rogatum respondent, semper accusatori plus quam ad rogatum, 
numquam laborant quem ad modum probent quod dicunt, sed quem ad modum se explicent dicendo. 
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ex-public officer, asks the judge to put a number of questions and refers to the intended 
actions with quaerere20:
(20) Acta purgationis Felicis, p. 201, 3-6 Apronianus: «Qua de re igitur de Ingentio 
quaerendum est, quatenus haec machinata sint ac fabricata, et quatenus uoluerit 
circumscribere magistrum ad mendacium». 
Apronianus: «Therefore, the question must be put to Ingentius as to why all these 
charges have been fabricated and what prompted him to induce the officer to 
lie».
(21) Acta purgationis Felicis, p. 203, 12-3, Apronianus: dixit: «Dignare de eo 
quaerere, qua auctoritate, quo dolo, qua insania circuierit Mauritanias omnes, 
Numidias etiam, qua ratione seditionem commouerit catholicae Ecclesiae».
Apronianus: «May it please your Lordship to ask him on what authority, with 
what deceitful purpose, for what madness he started travelling through the entire 
Mauritania, even through Numidia, with what intentions he started to stir dis-
sent against the Catholic Church».
(22) Acta purgationis Felicis, p. 201-2, 24-35, 1-4 Ziwsa: Apronianus dixit: «non 
ita, uenit ad Caecilianum, <dignare> quaerere de Caeciliano».
Apronianus: «That’s not true, he came up to Caecilianus, may it please your 
Lordship to ask Caecilianus himself».
(23) Gesta apud Zenophilum p. 193, 37-8 Ziwsa: Zenophilus u. c. consularis 
Nundinario dixit: «Quid aliud putas ex his esse quaerendum?». 
The right honourable Zenophilus, ex-consul, said to Nundinarius: «what else do 
you think I should ask of them?».
(24) Gesta apud Zenophilum p. 194, 32-3 Ziwsa: Zenophilus u. c. consularis 
Nundinario dixit: «De quadringentis follibus quos putas interrogandos?». 
The right honourable Zenophilus, ex-consul, said: «Whom do you think I 
should question about the four hundred coins?».
20 In the same text rogo as a performative no longer occurs, or in the technical sense ‘interro-
gating on the stand’, whereas it is used in the more current meaning of asking, or even begging 
someone to do something, for example Gesta collationis 3,253 Nihil absque mandato est; immo 
ut audientiam praestantia tua praebeat, hoc rogamus; Gesta collationis 1,208 Felix, Nouasinnensis 
episcopus, dixit: «ipse me rogauit in itinere, et ego pro ipso subscripsi».
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(25) Gesta apud Zenophilum Zenophilus u. c. consularis Nundinario dixit: 
«Quid aliud de Crescentiano putas esse requirendum?». Nundinarius dixit: 
«Ipsud est». 
In the last example, Apronianus’s interruption with the typical Late Latin ‘no’ an-
swer formula (non ita)21 sounds very abrupt, and even strikes a disrepectful note, which, 
a priori seems implausible, and even an unnecessary loss of control at a point where 
the course of debate does not need it. On the other hand, on reading this and similar 
Roman proceedings, one cannot help feeling that these transcripts are not fully objec-
tive but have been recast from the viewpoint of the winner, and the author of such min-
utes clearly sympathizes with the Caecilian party.
One category of first-person performative expressions which do occur in the late-an-
tique records are those related to the request made to the court that a given set of doc-
uments, letters, and such like, bearing on the evidence, be entered into the record.22 In 
these cases, counsel uses oro or even an antiquated expression, quaesumus, from quae-
so, which was by then obsolete, but had remained in usage for ‘I pray’, especially God. 
Quaeso, which after Cicero’s time was mostly used in parentheticals for ‘please’, is also 
used for a request that a witness be summoned to speak before the judge (Greek ἀξιῶ in 
juridical papyri: cf. e.g. P.Lips. 1.40 l. 9 ἀξιῶ τὸν σκρίβα εἰσελθεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ‘I ask that the 
scribe be deposed’; P.Col. 7.175 col. 3 l. 56 ἀξιῶ πύσματι σε αὐτο[ὺς] προσαγαγεῖν, ‘I ask 
you to let them come for interrogation’). See for example (26), where Maximus, counsel 
for the Catholic Church Elders, appears against Caecilianus and asks him to testify and 
declare whether a particularly incriminating letter was indeed written by him:
(26) Acta purgationis Felicis, p. 199, 1-6 Ziwsa: Maximus: «quaeso [...] apud 
acta deponat, utrumne iam de pactione secundum acta ab eodem habita litteras 
dederit, et utrum ea quae in litteris contulerit uera sint».
Maximus: «I ask him [...] to make his deposition in the Acts as to whether he 
gave (as is stated in the Acts) a letter in accordance with an agreement which he 
had already made (de pactione... ab eodem habita), and as to whether the state-
ments which he has made in the letter are true» (transl. Vassall-Phillips).
Observe however that quaeso does not address the defendant, as in the English trans-
lation: Maximus is using the very formal expression because he is asking the court that 
Caecilianus be called on as a witness. These documents therefore draw a distinction be-
tween quaero, used to describe the act of interrogating someone of inferior status, and 
21 Cf. Act. Apost. 16,37 non ita; Vitae patrum 3,165 (PL 73). 
22 See also Meyer 2004, 245-246.
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quaeso (interchangeble with oro), when an advocate addresses the presiding judge to 
prompt a line of inquiry, but also to ask that a given document or evidence be put on the 
record, no doubt for the judge to use it when passing sentence. See also: 
(27) Acta purgationis Felicis p. 199, 24-5 Maximus: «hanc lego et oro plena actis 
inseratur». 
(28) Acta purgationis Felicis p. 200, 12 Maximus: Quoniam eius epistolae lectio 
apud acta recitata est, quam ipse agnouit se misisse, quae dixit, quaesumus actis 
haereant.
4. Turn-taking, intervening, interrupting
All interaction in dialogue requires a controlled procedure of turn taking: people who 
‘do all the talking’ and fail to allow others any time to cut in and venture an opinion are 
blamed as uncouth or bad mannered. Interaction in court proceedings is of course ritu-
alized and hierarchical. The presiding judge is the umpire of the turns, but he need not 
always intervene and rule who will speak. During interrogations of witnesses, lawyers and 
witnesses can follow normal conversational rules, and detect such signals as intonation and 
pauses as a cue for cutting in. At the same time,  counsel may choose to interrupt a reticent 
or digressing witness to rein him or her in to answer the question more precisely.
In several late-antique reports of court proceedings, some abrupt interruptions are 
highlighted by dint of a repeated formula, an adversative cum construction. For example 
in the Gesta collationis (not a real trial, but a confrontation between ecclesiastical law-
yers under the supervision of an Imperial official), the chancellors who took the minutes 
routinely marked an interruption with phrases such as cum diceret (in Greek judicial pro-
ceedings papyri a similar phrase is found, see e.g. below, P. Col. 7.175 καὶ ἑξῆς λέγοντος, 
Ἀλέξανδρος ῥήτωρ εἶπεν ‘and while he was speaking Alexander the lawyer said’), 
In the Republican adversarial system, counsel objected to what his opposite number 
did, for example during cross-questioning. We do not have the exact phrase in direct 
speech (‘objection, your Honour’) in the Latin evidence, but we have some passages in 
which such an interruption was recorded along with the motivation which had prompt-
ed it. For example Hortensius, during the Verres trial, made a very apt interruption 
when Cicero was accusing Verres of being responsible for the death of the Lampsacus 
notable Philodamus:
(29) Quint. inst. VI 3,89 ut Cicero fecit cum ei testem in iudicio Verris roganti 
dixisset Hortensius: «non intellego haec aenigmata»; «atqui debes - inquit - 
cum Sphingem domi habeas»; acceperat autem ille a Verre Sphingem aeneam 
magnae pecuniae. 
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(30) Cic. Verr. II 1,71 in Tetti testimonio priore actione interpellauit Hortensius 
[...] hoc tum dixit, Philodamum et filium eius a C. Nerone esse damnatos.
(31) Cic. Brut. 260 fuit accusator, inquit, uetus, quo accusante C. Hirtilium Sisenna 
defendens dixit quaedam eius sputatilica esse crimina. tum C. Rusius: «circumue-
nior - inquit - iudices, nisi subuenitis. Sisenna quid dicat nescio; metuo insidias. 
sputatilica, quid est hoc? sputa quid sit scio, tilica nescio». maxumi risus.
Interpello, however, is a description of the ‘interruption’, not the performative verb 
which must have marked the act. Objection on a point of law in Latin is excipio and even 
if we have no law-suit contexts in Latin in which an advocate stands up to pronounce 
this phrase, nor do we have the judge’s reactions to it (for example ‘sustained’, or ‘over-
ruled’), it is possible that excipio was the expression thus used23.
It is only in a few Greek papyri and inscriptions of the Roman period that we have 
the vignette of the opposing counsel interrupting an incorrect statement by his opposite 
number, with the phrase παραγράφομαι24:
(32) P. Columbia 7.175 col. 2, 20-25 (Theodorus) καὶ ἀναγνοὺς προσέθηκεν· οὐχ 
ἁπλῶς οὐδ’ὡς ἔτυχεν αἱ συνηγορούμεναι λιβέλλον ἀνέτειναν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπαρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν· 
καὶ ἑξῆς λέγοντος, Ἀλέξανδρος ῥήτωρ εἶπεν· παραγράφομαι. / ὁ σύνδικος αὐτῷ εἶπεν· 
εἰπὲ τὴν παραγραφήν. Ἀλέξανδρος εἶπεν· εὐκταῖον μὲν ἦν τοῖς συνηγορουμένοις τὸν 
ἀγῶνα συστήσασθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ μείζονος δικαστηρίου πρὸς τὸ συκοφάντας φανείσας τὰς 
ἀντιδίκους τιμωρίαν ὑποστῆναι· πάντα γὰρ ἐσυκοφάντησαν δι’οὗ ἀνήνεγκαν λιβέλλου 
ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπαρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν25.
23 Exceptio was in origin a clause qualifying the formula under whose provisions a defendant 
was brought to trial: if the object of the exceptio was found to be true, the charge was to be dis-
missed. Exceptiones were therefore included in the pre-trial formula (in iure) in the Republican 
period, but we know from various sources that the term, at a later period, became more vague 
in application, when the procedure became the cognitio extra ordinem, no longer bound to the 
formular system or the double stage in iure / in iudicio. Since the trial procedure was not so tightly 
regulated, it is not clear what use defence and prosecution counsel made of exceptiones and replica-
tiones, and to what extent a presiding judge would be bound to rule or alter the course of question-
ing on the basis of points of law and procedure raised by such interruptions. In Cic. Verr. II 1,71 
Hortensius’ objection is clearly a point of relevance (the execution of Philodamus was the result 
of a death sentence issued by the lawful provincial governor, Nero, and therefore Verres could not 
be blamed for it). In the proceedings from P. Col. 175 (AD 339), Alexandros raises a point of law, 
the praescriptio longi temporis whereby it is shown that the claimants, although absent for a period 
of five years, are still in possession of the land and are therefore liable for all taxes pertaining to it.
24 In quoting extracts from papyri I have normalized the Greek and I have deleted diacritics 
for abbreviations.
25 Several Egyptian papyri of the Roman period provide interesting evidence, especially when 
the transcripts reveal signs of speakers’ embarrassment or irritation. Here is a very provisional list 
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After reading this, he added, «Neither thoughtlessly nor at random did my cli-
ents submit a petition to the Prefect». As he was continuing, Alexandros, advo-
cate, said «Objection!». The defensor civitatis said to him, «State your objec-
tion». Alexandros said, «It would have suited my clients to plead the case before 
the higher court in order to have our opponents undergo punishment when their 
malice became evident, or there is nothing but malice in the petition which they 
submitted to the Prefect».
Interruption could be motivated, naturally enough, by the need to bring to every-
one’s attention what counsel wanted to be perceived as a lie, during witness questioning. 
In the second Donatist record extant from Parisinus Latinus 1711, the Acta purgationis 
Felicis, Caecilianus’ counsel Apronianus interrupts the interrogation of Ingentius, his 
client’s accuser:
(33)p. 203, 15-20 Ziwsa: Aelianus proconsul dixit: «Ad Numidias fuisti?». 
Respondit: «Non, domine: sit qui probet». Aelianus proconsul dixit: «Nec in 
Mauritania?». Respondit: «Negotiari illo fui». Apronianus dixit: «Et in hoc 
mentitur, domine (nam ad Mauritaniae situm nonnisi per Numidias pergitur), 
quatenus dicit se in Mauritania fuisse, non fuisse in Numidia».
Aelianus: «Where you in Numidia?». Answer: «No, my lord - I have [someone] 
who could prove it». Aelianus: «Nor in Mauritania». Answer: «I went there to 
trade». Apronianus: «In this too, my lord, he is lying (indeed, it is impossible to 
reach anywhere in Mauritania unless through Numidia), inasmuch as he says he 
has been in Mauritania, but not in Numidia». 
Ascertaining whether Ingentius ever was in Numidia seems a small gain, and 
Ingentius’s assertion that he never was in Numidia may be read as a shortcut (he meant 
that he never ‘stayed’ in Numidia), but Apronianus is quick to point out the impossi-
bility of reaching Mauritania without crossing Numidia, so as to throw discredit on the 
witness and undermine the whole of Ingentius’s deposition. 
In general, however, the records of court proceedings which have have come down 
to us in papyri and inscriptions are not reliable enough, from a linguistic viewpoint, or 
alert enough to the subtleties of linguistic interaction to give a sound basis for interpret-
ing the linguistic behaviour of the participants.
It is unlikely, for example, that the turns were so abrupt and the manner of address of 
the two lawyers to the sitting judge, the emperor in appeal to boot, was so direct in the 
of papyri where I have found features of some linguistic interest in terms of linguistic interaction: 
P.Oxy. 2955; 3117; 3758; 3619; P.Strasb. 1.41 (an old man called Peison on the witness stand); 
P.Flor. 1.61; P.Lond. inv. 2565; P.Oslo 80; P.Lips. 1.38; P.Lips. 1.32.
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following inscription from Syria, the Cognitio Imperatoris Caracallae de Goharienis a. 
216 (= SEG 17, 1960, 759), in which two lawyers debate the rights to appeal of a local 
Syrian community, the Gohareni, who had tried to challenge the tax immunity of a local 
notable26. See for example 
(34) col. II 25-6 Antoninus Augustus dixit: «λέγεις οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἐξεκαλέσατο;». 
Aristaenetus dixit: «οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἔκκλητον ὅτι οὐκ ἐξῆν». [...] 31-5 «οὐ θέλειϛ ἐμὲ 
ἀκοῦσαι τοῦ πράγματοϛ;». Aristaenetus dixit: «λέγω». Antoninus Augustus dixit: 
«Ἐγὼ εἰ ἔσπευδον ἐντεῦθεν ἀναστῆναι ἔλεγον·‘ἡ παραγραφὴ χώραν ἔχει’. ἐν τίσιν οὖν 
μέμφομαι;». Lollianus dixit: «λέγω ἐντὸϛ ἡμισείαϛ et subiunxit» [...]
Antoninus Augustus said: «you say, then, that there was no appeal procedure?». 
Aristaenetus said: «there is no appeal because it was not lawful». [...] Antoninus 
Augustus said: «You don’t want me to hear the cause?». Aristaenetus said: «No». 
Antoninus Augustus said: «If I had to hurry to get up from here, I would say ‘the 
objection is upheld.’ So in what respects is the cause to be heard?». Lollianus 
said: «I can tell you in a half hour, and he added» […]
The two lawyers are never reported as addressing one another, but they invariably 
talk to the emperor. Caracalla sounds caustic at times, but the two lawyers are equal-
ly curt. It is, I think, reasonable to assume that this is a false impression determined 
by loose reporting in the document (an inscription, but no doubt taken from court 
minutes), because the two lawyers’s phrases could easily be construed as disrespectful: 
Aristaenetus’s answers (ὅτι οὐκ ἐξῆν... λέγω) are implausibily blunt, especially considering 
that he is addressing an emperor, and Lollianus’s ‘give me half an hour’ seems to call for 
some very cutting response from the emperor, who presumably wants to go straight to 
the heart of the matter.
Other examples where the suspicion arises that the minutes are not precise 
enough to allow for the niceties of verbal exchange are from some other bilingual 
reports of sessions. When two speakers speak in different languages, some gesture 
of apology is needed. But in the following two documents speakers each use their 
language without any accommodation or apologetic measure. Presumably because 
of the need of the notarius for concision, the ceremoniousness is cut down to zero, 
and the two speakers interact each in his or her own language, without the expected 
apologetic gestures by the less important speaker, who is using a native language 
without regard for the other:
26 For a full commentary and further references of all problematic issues cf. Laffi 2013, 80-3. 
As usual, I have resolved all abbreviations and included all supplements in the text without dia-
critics. ἐν τίσιν οὖν μέμφομαι is of contested interpretation, and probably corrupt. 
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(35) Codex Theodosianus VIII 15,1 Agrippina dixit: «τῷ τόπῳ ἑκείνῳ οὐκ 
ἐπαγάρχει». Constantinus A. dixit: «sed iure continetur, ne quis in administratione 
constitutus aliquid compararet, unde quidem nihil interest, an in suo pago an 
in alieno comparauit, cum constet contra ius eundem comparasse». Et adiecit: 
«ignoratis fiscale effici totum, quidquid administrantes comparauerint?». 
Agrippina dixit: «τοῦ τόπου ἑκείνου πραιπόσιτοϛ οὐκ ἦν· ἐγὼ ἠγόρασα παρὰ τοῦ 
ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἴδε αἱ ὡναί». Constantinus A. d(ixit): «recipient a uenditore 
Codia et Agrippina competens pretium».
Agrippina said: «he was not in charge of that district». Constantinus Augustus 
said: «But the law states that no public administrator can acquire property while 
in office, therefore it makes no difference if he bought land in his district or in an-
other’s, since he appears to have acted all the same in contravention of the law». 
And he added: «are you ignorant of the fact that whatever officials have pur-
chased (in this manner) is requisitioned by the public purse?» Agrippina said: 
«he was not the president of that district; I bought (the land) from his brother: 
here are the contracts». Constantinus Augustus said: «Codia and Agrippina will 
receive from the seller appropriate compensation».
In (35), the emperor Constantine sits in judgement at the appeal hearing of a land-
owner, one Agrippina also acting for her sister Codia. Her land has been confiscated be-
cause the previous owner had acquired it illegally (he was a state official and was there-
fore not allowed to buy property while in the tenure of office). The two claimants reply 
that the official was not in charge in that district, but Constantine rules that the pre-
scription applied generally to all administrators regardless of where they have jurisdic-
tion. However, the two women will receive compensation from the previous owner for 
the sum paid over the purchase of the estate. What is noteworthy in this document is the 
articulation of the exchanges between Agrippina and the emperor (unfortunately a page 
must have been missing in the antigraph of the MS preserving the text, Par. Lat. 9643 
f. 118, and the initial parts of the scene are lost). In her second reply, Agrippina speaks 
in Greek, and her reply is clearly intended to counter the emperor’s assertion. Her final 
lines τοῦ τόπου ἑκείνου πραιπόσιτοϛ οὐκ ἦν· ἐγὼ ἠγόρασα παρὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἴδε αἱ 
ὡναί, besides repeating (if the text is sound) a previous point, dangerously take no notice 
of what the emperor just said (‘no matter where he had jurisidiction, whatever admin-
istrators purchase in contravention of the law becomes confiscated’); she then tries to 
bring in new evidence in the shape of documents proving that the seller was the officer’s 
brother, evidence to which Constantine seems to pay no attention. Equally strange is 
the immediate succession of Latin (Constantine) and Greek in the exchange of the two 
speakers: especially the way in which Agrippina, as the dialogue has come down to us, 
fills in her Greek phrases in the most natural manner is very surprising, and unlikely to 
reflect realistically the course of the exchange, in which she must either have addressed 
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an interpreter or a lawyer who then spoke to the emperor. It is inevitable to assume that 
this document is a selective report27.
A slightly more realistic situation emerges from the report preserved in Digesta 
XXVIII 4,3, where the heirs of one Nepos appealed to the emperor against the testator’s 
change of mind in his dying moments, when he had deleted from the will the names of 
the inheritors (in this case, the intestate’s estate went to the emperor):
(36) Dig. XXVIII 4,3 «Cum Valerius Nepos mutata uoluntate et inciderit tes-
tamentum suum et heredum nomina induxerit, hereditas eius secundum diui 
patris mei constitutionem ad eos qui scripti fuerint pertinere non uidetur». Et 
aduocatis fisci dixit: «Vos habetis iudices uestros». Vibius Zeno dixit: «Rogo, 
domine imperator, audias me patienter: de legatis quid statues?», Antoninus 
Caesar dixit: «Videtur tibi uoluisse testamentum ualere, qui nomina heredum 
induxit?». Cornelius Priscianus aduocatus Leonis dixit: «Nomina heredum tan-
tum induxit». Calpurnius Longinus aduocatus fisci dixit: «Non potest ullum 
testamentum ualere, quod heredem non habet». Priscianus dixit: «Manumisit 
quosdam et legata dedit». Antoninus Caesar remotis omnibus cum deliberas-
set et admitti rursus eodem iussisset, dixit: «Causa praesens admittere uidetur 
humaniorem interpretationem, ut ea dumtaxat existimemus Nepotem irrita esse 
uoluisse quae induxit».
«Since Valerius Nepos, changing his mind, re-opened his last will and deleted 
the names of the heirs, his property, following the statutes of my late father 
the emperor cannot be assigned to those who were previously the recipients». 
And he then said to the treasury lawyers: «You have your ruling». Vibius 
Zeno said: «Your Highness, I beg you to listen to me with indulgence: what 
will you decide concerning the bequests?». Antoninus Caesar said: «Do 
you think he wanted a will to be valid when he struck out the names of his 
heirs?». Cornelius Priscianus, acting on behalf of Leo, said: «He struck out 
only the heirs’ names». Calpurnius Longinus, the treasury lawyer, said: «No 
testament can be valid if there is no heir». Priscianus said:  «He manumitted 
some of them and left bequests». Antoninus Caesar dismissed all present and 
withdrew to deliberate; when he later let everyone in again, he said: «The 
present cause seems to be compatible with a more humane interpretation 
(of the law), and we will rule that Nepos only made null and void what he 
blotted out». 
27 A similar type occurs in PSI 1309, e.g. u(ir) c(larissimus) pr(aeses) Rufino d(ixit): confides 
negotio tuo? Rufinus d(ixit): πέποιθα τῷ ἐμῷ πράγματι. Both passages are discussed in Adams 2003, 
386-7, where the lack of accommodation is seen in the context of Latin as the language of power, 
with use of Latin showing the president’s aloofness as a representative of Roman authority. 
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One of the appeal lawyers, Vibius Zeno, asks for permission to speak after the emperor 
has finished speaking, with the appropriately respectful tone (rogo, domine...), to raise a 
point about the legates, i.e. that they should require a separate ruling from the rest of the 
estate as set out in the will. The emperor replies with a vaguely reproachful phrase, almost 
challenging the sense of the objection (does it seem to him that the intention of a man who 
blotted out the heirs’ names was to make the will valid?), but the lawyers doggedly insist 
that only the names were cancelled, not the provisions/legates. The public attorney makes 
a point of law and, finally, the emperor retires to his chambers, presumably with his con-
silium and, when court sits again, rules that a more humane interpretation is in order: the 
court will assume that the testator, Nepos, intended that only the parts he cancelled should 
be invalid, so that presumably manumitted slaves will permitted to be free. 
Here the dynamics of the linguistic interaction seems more realistic. The lawyer who 
speaks first begs for indulgence when he makes a point in which he very tactfully draws 
attention to an aspect ignored by the general ruling of the emperor, namely the fate of 
bequests if the will is void. The emperor replies with words which may be construed 
as slightly polemical (‘it seems to you...), but then the dialogue is carried out by other 
lawyers present, each one suggesting a forgotten point as if acting in concert, so that in 
the end the emperor’s subsuming the suggestion in his final ruling is a reflection of his 
wisdom and humanity.
Finally, a protracted scene of altercation between two groups of lawyers comes from 
the Gesta collationis Carthaginiensis, a very complicated and unique record of a con-
ference held in 411 before the imperial legate Marcellinus. The opposing parties were 
the representatives of the Catholic and the Donatist Church of Africa, who were to set 
out their grievances before the imperial arbitrator. In this extract, containing a record 
of a preliminary session, seven lawyers for each party check out the genuineness of the 
signatories who have undersigned the two competing documents to be deposited with 
the court, containing the respective charges against the other party, and disagreement 
arises because the authenticity of some signatures is disputed. In the following extract 
Donatist and Catholic lawyers (who were mostly also bishops) argue about the authen-
ticity of one Quodvultdeus’s signature, who, despite not being present at the session 
and said to have died on the journey to Carthage, appears to have placed his signature 
on the court’s document. The passage is noteworthy because it records the sequence 
of interventions in seemingly very spontaneous form and order, and gives a very vivid 
picture of an unstructured court altercation. The main speaker is Petilianus, a Donatist 
bishop and lawyer, who tries to defend the authenticity of Quodvultdeus’s signature. He 
is questioned by the judge and the other lawyers present exactly as a witness could be 
questioned about a fact, and so his attempts to find a tenable version seem appropriately 
set in this context (NOTE: bold type is for Donatist lawyers; all other speakers except 
the president, Marcellinus, are Catholic lawyers):
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(37) Gesta collationis Carthaginiensis 207-208 Lancel: Quoduultdeus episcopus 
Cessitanus. 207. Petilianus episcopus dixit. In itinere defecit. Fortunatianus 
episcopus Ecclesiae catholicae dixit. Qui in itinere dicitur defecisse, quemadmo-
dum inuenitur subscripsisse doceatur. Petilianus. Non de ipso dictum est, ca-
lumniose agis, de altero suggestum est. Fortunatianus. De quo? Petilianus. Qui 
decessit in uia.
Petilianus is openly trying to buy some time. When the court usher reads 
Quodvultdeus’s name, Petilianus cuts in and says «he died during the journey», and 
that’s the reason why he is not present today to confirm his mandate. One of the opposing 
lawyers, Fortunatianus, counters «[with regard to the one] who is stated to have died 
during the journey, let the other side show how he can be found to have signed». The 
following phrase pronounced by Petilianus seems an open attempt to confuse the issue: 
«that’s not being said about him, that’s defamatory, it was said of the other one». 
«which one?». «He who died during the journey».
(38) ibidem 208 Lancel: Alypius episcopus Ecclesiae catholicae dixit. Recitentur 
nomina, ut eadem agnoscat. Fortunatianus. Si in uia defecit, quomodo subscrip-
sit? Aurelius episcopus Ecclesiae catholicae Carthaginis dixit. Clericus pro mortuo 
subscripsit? Alypius. Eligat sibi ut ostendam quomodo mentiatur. Marcellinus 
uir clarissimus tribunus et notarius dixit. Doceatur quomodo is qui in itine-
re dicitur defecisse, subscripserit. Alypius. Recitetur utrum clericus ex nomine 
suo subscripserit, an ex nomine defuncti. Marcellinus. Recitetur cuius nomine 
subscripserit qui in itinere dicitur defecisse. Item recitauit. Quoduultdeus episco-
pus Cessitanus aeger subscripsi. 
The subsequent section (38) of the record shows the Catholic lawyers plunging in 
to attack the weak spot of the Donatist side, with a series of more and more scathing 
suggestions and comments, up until the point when the judge halts this to summon the 
clerk to read ‘how the signature of him who is said to have died while on the journey is 
certified.’
(39) ibidem 208 Lancel: Fortunatianus. Aduertit nobilitas tua, nullius cleri-
ci nomen pro defuncti nomine subscripsisse, sed tamquam uiui, mortui nobis, 
qui in uia iuxta eorum professionem dicitur defecisse, subscriptionem obtulisse. 
Petilianus. Quid si et iste moriatur, qui aeger subscripsit? quasi hodie non unus 
defecit. Aurelius. Sed in itinere defecisse dixisti. Alypius. Sufficiunt ista deprehen-
sa. Cetera subsequantur. Petilianus. Nihil deprehendisti, argumentaris contra 
ueritatem. Alypius. Tu dixisti. 208. Marcellinus. Si uerum est, ut asseritis, quod 
in itinere defecit, constat eius subscriptionem falsissime recitatam: sin uero ipse 
subscripsit, non potuit in itinere deperire. Petilianus. Non est humanum mori? 
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Non etiam morientes testamentis suis subscribunt? Alypius. Humanitatis est 
mori, sed inhumanitatis est fallere. Petilianus. Non est hoc fallere, quia potuit 
reuertens in itinere mori. Mandatum adhuc modo accipio. Dico quid moneat.
Petilianus attempts to parry the other side’s sneering comments with similar irony, 
but feebly: «what if he who signed while sick subsequently died–as if there weren’t 
many who die every day». He succeeds in devising a form of credible explanation only 
after a great deal of cut and thrust with the other side, and even the judge leans towards 
a negative conclusion. At this point Petilianus says: «there is no deception here, because 
he may well have died on the journey back. I can still receive his mandate. I say now what 
it contains». To which the judge responds by asking the clerk to read the date of the 
subscriptions again, and while the date and names are being read Aurelius (Augustine) 
interrupts with a caustic comment: ‘a little while ago he had signed himself, now a clerk 
has signed for him, now the bishop did it.
(40) ibidem 208 Lancel: Et cum recitaret, Aurelius episcopus Ecclesiae catholicae dix-
it. Iamdudum ipse subscripsit. Modo dixit clericus subscripsit, modo episcopus. Et 
cum diceret, Marcellinus [...] dixit. Aduertitis, praesentes praesentibus peragendi ne-
gotii dedisse mandatum. Quomodo igitur hic qui praesens in hac urbe se inter ce-
teros sine dubio mandasse professus est et in itinere dicitur defecisse, et in hac urbe 
subscripsisse mandato? Adeodatus. Octo dies emensi sunt, ut mandatum confectum 
est. Is qui mandauit, de cuius nomine nunc agitur, cum aegrotare coepisset, ad pro-
pria remeans in itinere defecit. Vincentius episcopus Ecclesiae catholicae dixit. Dicat 
quo in loco defecit. Adeodatus. Non noui locum. Marcellinus. Quoniam probabilis 
est uestrae sanctitatis prosecutio, qua eum hic fuisse et aegrum ad propria remean-
tem defecisse testaris, saltem hoc docere te conuenit, ut utrum in hac urbe fuerit sub 
Dei testificatione designes. Fortunatianus. Si praecipit sublimitas tua, Petiliani uiri 
clarissimi prosecutio recitetur, ut ex lectione cognoscant uniuersi, quam non uere 
nunc dicatur eum repedantem de Carthagine, in itinere defecisse, quia aliter eum 
eius prosecutio demonstrauit. Marcellinus. Legatur prosecutio postulata. Cumque 
ex codice legeretur, Marcellinus [...] dixit. Nihil mihi uidetur amplius de hac parte 
quaerendum, nisi ut sub testificatione diuina utrum hic praesens fuerit de quo agi-
tur, simplici professione pandatur.
Finally, the judge decides in favour of accepting the signature as deposited before the 
old man died on his way back, provided the Donatists lawyers make a sworn statement 
to this effect. An interesting remark is that of Fortunatianus, who asks the judge to allow 
the clerk to read his learned friend Petilianus’s previous statement, where it was not clear 
that the man had died ‘on his way back’, but the judge seems to conclude (though this is 
not made explicit in the record) that Petilianus’ statement was not a straightforward lie 
and allows the signature to be admitted. 
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5. Opining witnesses in Roman courts
An interesting description of a witness’s deposition is found in Cicero, Pro Fonteio 
29, an oration in which Cicero defended a Roman governor of Narbonensis, charged 
with embezzlement. The prosecution was brought about by various parties, including 
some Gaulish tribes whose spokesman was the Romanized chief Indutiomarus. Cicero, 
who had an obvious interest in trying to belittle his testimony, dwelt on his being de-
posed in 29:
(41) Font. 28-9 Recordamini, iudices, quanto opere laborare soleatis non modo 
quid dicatis pro testimonio sed etiam quibus uerbis utamini, ne quod minus 
moderate positum, ne quod ab aliqua cupiditate prolapsum uerbum esse uide-
atur; uoltu denique laboratis ne qua significari possit suspicio cupiditatis, ut et, 
cum proditis, existimatio sit quaedam tacita de uobis pudoris ac religionis et, 
cum disceditis, ea diligenter conseruata ac retenta uideatur. Credo haec eadem 
Indutiomarum in testimonio timuisse aut cogitauisse, qui primum illud uerbum 
consideratissimum nostrae consuetudinis ‘arbitror’, quo nos etiam tunc utimur 
cum ea dicimus iurati quae comperta habemus, quae ipsi uidimus, ex toto testi-
monio suo sustulit atque omnia se ‘scire’ dixit.
Recollect, O judges, with what great pains you are accustomed to labouring, 
considering not only what you are going to state in your evidence, but even what 
words you plan to use, lest any word should appear to be used too moderately, or 
lest on the other hand any expression should appear to have escaped you due to 
any private motive. You take pains even so to mould your countenances, that no 
suspicion of any private motive may be aroused; that when you come forward 
there may be a sort of silent opinion of your modesty and scrupulousness, and 
that, when you leave the box, that reputation may appear to have been carefully 
preserved and retained. I suppose Indutiomarus, when he gave his evidence, had 
all these fears and all these thoughts; he, who left out of his whole evidence that 
most considerate word, to which we are all habituated, ‘I think’, a word which 
we use even when we are relating on oath what we know by our own knowledge, 
what we ourselves have seen; and said that he ‘knew’ everything he was stating.
The passage is of interest also for its description of the outward appearance of the 
good witness, impassive and impartial, not motivated by private acrimony or favour. But 
I am discussing the passage here by virtue of its reference to the form of Indutiomarus’s 
deposition. According to Cicero, Indutiomarus offended convention by introducing his 
assertion with ‘I know’, scio, rather than with arbitror. There is no reason to doubt that 
Cicero was reporting acceptable habit, indeed the only acceptable way of answering, even 
if we are used to witnesses being rebuked for airing an opinion rather than a fact. Indeed, 
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there may have been no clear-cut procedural rule (Cicero does not say that the presiding 
judge rebuked Indutiomarus, and he surely would not have missed the chance had that 
been the case). I suggest that the issue was not legal, but one of linguistic politeness 
and etiquette: arbitror had a sort of vagueness and understatement that was in principle 
expected of Roman upper-class speakers, as I believe I have shown in my article (Ferri 
2012) while talking of the language of Terence’s senes. Indutiomarus, a second-language 
speaker of Latin, although presumably a fairly fluent one, is tendentiously shown by 
Cicero as an arrogant know-it-all, perhaps with an innuendo that such assertiveness 
masked an attempt to fabricate an untruth. In this way, Cicero was trying to make 
prejudice weigh against the reliability of a non-native speaker who merely spoke in a 
somewhat unidiomatic manner28.
The sociolinguistic interpretation of Indutiomarus’ fault is perhaps confirmed by 
Cicero’s phrase describing arbitror as a uerbum consideratissimum nostrae consuetudinis 
‘among the most highly prized words of our current language’: consuetudo is of course 
ambiguous, since it may refer to the ‘current practice’ of courts: it is however also a 
strongly connotated word describing the ‘current language’, and this may be very well 
its meaning here. 
Only Cicero has transmitted evidence for this manner of deposing, in
(42) Cic. Ac. II (Lucullus) 146, qui testimonium diceret ut arbitrari se diceret 
etiam quod ipse uidisset.
(our ancestors decided that) he who acted as witness was to say «I think» even 
in relation to what he had seen. 
and, though in slightly different words, in 
(43) Caecin. 73, Iste uester testis qui ausus est dicere «fecisse uideri» eum de quo 
ne cuius rei argueretur quidem scire potuit. 
That very witness of yours who dared to say «that he had been seen to do» in a 
case in which there was no way he could even know what the man was accused of.
28 The inarticulateness of foreigners on the stand is again made a target for ridicule by Cicero 
in Pro Flacco, 22, where - he complains - the Greek witnesses summoned by his learned colleague 
for the prosecution can only say the words dedi, dedimus (Cic. Flacc. 23 Nam aut oratio testium 
refelli solet aut uita laedi. Qua disputatione ora tionem refellam eius qui dicit: «dedimus», nihil 
amplius? In hominem dicendum est igitur, cum oratio argumentationem non habet. Quid dicam in 
ignotum?). Here Cicero is on purpose trying to fudge the issue, suggesting that linguistic embar-
rassment hides corruption and intentional reticence. 
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However this passage of Cicero refers to an abstract witness, not one of the ten 
whose depositions he has just outlined29. 
In short, Cicero is our only straightforward source for this form of deposition, from 
which we seem to learn that witnesses, even when deposing about what was supposed 
to have happened, presented the facts as ‘opinions’; in Cicero’s view, this was done to 
avoid giving an impression of arrogance, and because all human beings are subject to 
being deceived by false impressions, a point which he discusses in further detail from a 
philosophical perspective in Lucullus.
On the other hand, witnesses were indeed often called to the stand to give their 
opinions, as Cicero reports in De oratore, where Crassus was called to testify against 
Sextus Titius:
(45) Cic. de orat. II 48 nam et testimonium saepe dicendum est ac non numquam 
etiam accuratius, ut mihi etiam necesse fuit in Sex. Titium, seditiosum ciuem et 
turbulentum; explicaui in eo testimonio dicendo omnia consilia consulatus mei, 
quibus illi tribuno plebis pro re publica restitissem, quaeque ab eo contra rem pu-
blicam facta arbitrarer, exposui; diu retentus sum, multa audiui, multa respondi.
One often has to give a deposition as a witness, sometimes in great detail, as hap-
pened to me against Sextum Titium, a troublesome agitator. While deposing 
I took the opportunity to explain my reasons in my consulate for standing up 
to that tribune in defence of the state and I outlined all I believed he had done 
against the state. I was kept on the stand for some time and was asked a great 
many questions, and I answered many.
The support of influential personages was very important in Roman trials. Lawyers 
and witnesses spoke at length about a claimant’s or a plaintiff ’s character as a decisive el-
ement influencing the jury, and by all accounts it seems that witnesses on the stand, if so-
cially eminent, were allowed to give personal opinions. So for example in (39) Asconius, 
the imperial commentator of Cicero, relates the charges laid against Cornelius by the 
prosecution witnesses at the Cornelius trial: they simply “saw” Cornelius as he read out 
the new law before the assembly. As was normal for depositions of witnesses of exalt-
29 Another not very straightforward piece of evidence comes from Livy, III 13 premebat reum 
praeter uulgatam inuidiam crimen unum, quod M. Volscius Fictor... testis extiterat se [...] in iuuen-
tutem grassantem in Subura incidisse. ibi rixam natam esse, fratremque suum [...] pugno ictum ab 
Caesone cecidisse, semianimem inter manus domum ablatum mortuumque inde arbitrari (he had 
been picked up half-alive and carried home, and his death, Volscius considered, had resulted 
from this injury). Here however arbitrari need not necessarily represent the form of the witness 
statement praised by Cicero, since an element of subjectivity is always implied in establishing the 
cause of death of an individual.
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ed status, they threw their weight about, and ‘wanted it to be known widely that they 
regarded Cornelius’ actions as relevant to the charge of imminuta maiestas’—a consid-
eration which should be left to court and jury in modern proceedings, where a witness 
would probably be rebuked if he was to utter similar pronouncements.
(46) Asconius, In Cornelianam p. 49, 20-4 Stangl: Dixerunt autem hoc: uidis-
se se cum Cornelius in tribunatu codicem pro rostris ipse recitaret, quod ante 
Cornelium nemo fecisse existimaretur. Volebant uideri se iudicare eam rem ma-
gnopere ad crimen imminutae maiestatis tribuniciae pertinere; etenim prope tol-
lebatur intercessio, si id tribunis permitteretur.
This is what they said: they had seen when Cornelius, during his office as tribune, 
had read out the text of the law at the rostra, which no one had done before him. 
They wanted to go on record publicly as upholding the view that Cornelius’ ac-
tions fell within the operations of the charge imminutae maiestatis tribuniciae. 
In fact, in their view, the tribunician intercession was almost without force, if 
actions such as these were to be permitted to the future tribunes30.
A witness deposition with scire occurs in the written statement included in the acts 
pertaining to Petronia Iusta, one of the Tabulae Herculanenses, an inheritance action 
from the year 74 CE, in which the claimant needed to prove that she had been born free:
(47) Tabulae Herculanenses 17 Q(uintus) Tamudius Optatus scripsi iura/uique 
per Genium Imp(eratoris) Ves/pasiani Caes(aris) Aug(usti) liberorumque / me 
adfuisse Petroniae Vitali / cum haberet cum Calatoria / Themide de pu[e]lla filia 
/ sua ibi me audisse dicen/tem Stephanu(m) [mari]t[um] / Themidis Petroniae / 
Vitali quid invides f[i]/liae cum eam nos / filiae loc[o fa]ciamus / ex eo me [scire] 
mulie/rem q(ua) d(e) a(gitur) Petroniae / Vitalis fi[l]iam et ingenuam esse q(uae) 
r(es) a(gitur) /)
I, Quintus Tamudius Optatus, hereby testify under oath in the name of the 
Emperor Vespasian Augustus and his sons that I was at the side of Petronia Vitalis 
when she discussed with Calatoria Themis the matter of the girl her daughter. 
There I heard Stephanus, Themis’s husband, say to Petronia Vitalis ‘why do you 
act against the daughter, since we consider her the same as a daughter’. Hence 
I state that I know that the woman about whom the present procedure is held 
was a daughter of Petronia Vitalis, as well as free-born, about which the present 
procedure is held31.
30 See, for a translation, Squires.
31 Translation and interpretation of the documents pertaining to Petronia Iusta in Crook 
1984, 48-9. The text is very uncertain: for example haberet cum meaning ‘discussing with’ is an 
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scire also occurs in the Gesta apud Zenophilum in the depositions of several workers. 
The Petronia Iusta and the Gesta together suggest that no rule about the form of the 
deposition was in force, but arbitror was part of an accepted etiquette. People of lower 
standing were not expected to abide by this unwritten rule.
(48) p. 193, 7ss. Ziwsa: Zenophilus u. c. consularis dixit: «Siluanum scis esse tra-
ditorem?». Saturninus dixit: «Scio lucernam tradidisse argenteam». Zenophilus 
u. c. consularis Saturnino dixit: «Quid aliud?». Saturninus respondit: «Aliud 
nescio, nisi quia de post orcam eam eiecit». [...] Zenophilus u. c. dixit: «Tabulam 
argenteam quis tradidit?». Victor respondit: «Non uidi. quod scio, hoc dico». 
Zenophilus said: «Do you know that Silvanus is a Betrayer?». Saturninus said: 
«I know that he gave up a silver lamp». Zenophilus said to Saturninus: «What 
else?». Saturninus said: «I do not know of anything else, excepting that he took 
the lamp from behind a tun.» […] Zenophilus said: «Who gave up the silver ta-
ble?». Victor answered: «I did not see what I know I will tell you».
6. Lawyers’ Latin: intimidation, ambiguity, and evasion. 
The aggressive linguistic behaviour of barristers in a trial was commonly in evidence 
during cross-questioning, where it was expected that a witness would be accused of ly-
ing, and counsel tried to make a witness contradict himself or herself. The lawyer was 
expected to have tried to confuse a witness, at least in the eyes of the jury, or to represent 
his narrative as contradictory and therefore unreliable. A long and probably exemplary 
sample of this manner comes from the In Vatinium.
(49) Cic. Vatin. 2-3, 40-41 Sed <te> hesterno <die> pro testimonio esse menti-
tum, cum adfirmares nullum tibi omnino cum Albinouano sermonem non modo 
de Sestio accusando, sed nulla umquam de re fuisse, paulo ante imprudens indi-
casti, qui et T. Claudium tecum communicasse et a te consilium P. Sesti accusandi 
petisse, et Albinouanum, quem antea uix tibi notum esse dixisses, domum tuam 
uenisse, multa tecum locutum dixeris, denique contiones P. Sesti scriptas, quas 
neque nosset neque reperire posset, te Albinouano dedisse easque in hoc iudi-
cio esse recitatas. In quo alterum es confessus, a te accusatores esse instructos et 
subornatos, in altero inconstantiam tuam cum leuitate tum etiam periurio impli-
catam refellisti, cum, quem a te alienissimum esse dixisses, eum domi tuae fuisse, 
interesting construction but so far unparalleled. The entire set of these tabulae, after the princeps 
by Pugliese Carratelli and Arangio Ruiz, is now being republished by G. Camodeca, with new 
additional documents.
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quem praeuaricatorem esse ab initio iudicasses, ei te quos rogasset ad accusandum 
libros dixeris dedisse. [...]  Extremum illud est quod mihi abs te responderi uelim; 
cum multa in Albinouanum de praeuaricatione diceres, dixerisne nec tibi placu-
isse nec oportuisse Sestium de ui reum fieri, quauis lege, quouis crimine accusan-
dum potius fuisse? [...] sed hoc quaero, num P. Sestium, qua lege accusandum 
omnino fuisse negas, ea lege condemnari putes oportere? aut, si te in testimonio 
consuli noles, ne quid tibi auctoritatis a me tributum esse uideatur, dixerisne in 
eum testimonium de ui quem negaris reum omnino de ui fieri debuisse?
But you unintentionally showed a few moments ago that you spoke falsely in 
the evidence which you gave yesterday, when you asserted that you had never 
had the least conversation with Albinovanus, not only about the prosecution 
of Sestius, but about anything whatever; and yet you said just now that Titus 
Claudius had been in communication with you, and had asked your advice with 
respect to the conduct of the prosecution against Sestius, and that Albinovanus, 
who you had said before was hardly known to you, had come to your house, and 
had held a long conversation with you. And lastly, you said that you had given 
Albinovanus the written harangues of Publius Sestius, which he had never had 
any knowledge of, and did not know where to find, and that they had been read 
at this trial. And by one of these statements you confessed that the accusers had 
been instructed and suborned by you; and by the other you confessed your own 
inconsistency, thus becoming liable to the double charge of folly and of perjury; 
when you stated that the man who you had previously said was an entire stranger 
to you, had come to your house, and that you had given the documents which 
he asked for to aid him in his accusation against a man whom you had from the 
beginning considered a trickster and a prevaricator [...] The last thing which I 
wish you to answer me is this: -As you said a great deal against Albinovanus with 
respect to his prevarication, I wish to know whether you said or did not say that 
you were not pleased at Sestius being prosecuted for violence, and that he ought 
not to have been so prosecuted; and that there was no law and no charge on 
which he was no longer liable to impeachment? [...] But I ask this; - whether you 
think that Publius Sestius ought to be condemned according to the provisions 
of a law under which you say that he never ought to have been accused at all? or, 
if you think that your opinion ought not to be asked while you are giving your 
evidence, lest I should appear to be attributing to you any authority by so doing, 
I ask whether you gave evidence against a man on his trial for violence, who you 
say never ought to have been prosecuted for violence at all?
In this long extract from what is regarded as a rielaboration of a court document, 
perhaps from Cicero’s own notes during his cross-questioning of Vatinius, Cicero is bent 
on trying to cast Vatinius as a liar before the jury, and conniving with the accusers. But 
Cicero is also twisting and distorting a phrase reported to have been pronounced by 
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Vatinius, that Sestius should not have been brought to trial under the provisions of the 
law De ui, against political violence. Cicero is staking his hand on Vatinius not being in a 
position to explain himself at leisure, as we presume that witnesses were expected to give 
short factual answers. Cicero is therefore intentionally confusing a phrase containing 
non oportet, genuinely uttered by Vatinius and referring to opportunity (because of the 
lack of solid proof in the incrimination of Sestius), and a deontic meaning of the same 
verb which he construes, for the benefit of the jury, to refer to lack of guilt and perjury.
(50) Cic. Quinct. 79 Bona postulas ut ex edicto possidere liceat. Quo die? Te 
ipsum, Naeui, uolo audire; uolo inauditum facinus ipsius qui id commisit uoce 
conuinci. Dic, Naeui, diem. «Ante <diem> v Kalend. intercalaris». Bene ais. 
Quam longe est hinc in saltum uestrum Gallicanum? Naeui, te rogo. «dcc milia 
passuum». Optime. De saltu deicitur Quinctius - quo die? possumus hoc quoque 
ex te audire? Quid taces? dic, inquam, diem. Pudet dicere; intellego; uerum et 
sero et nequiquam pudet. Deicitur de saltu, C. Aquili, pridie Kalend. intercalaris; 
biduo post aut, ut statim de iure aliquis cucurrerit, non toto triduo dcc milia 
passuum conficiuntur.
You demand to be allowed to take possession of his goods according to the edict. 
On what day? I wish to hear you yourself, O Naevius. I want this unheard-of 
action to be proved by the voice of the very man who has committed it. Mention 
the day, Naevius. «The twentieth of February». Thank you. How far is it from 
hence to your estate in Gaul? I ask you, Naevius. «Seven hundred miles». Very 
well: Quinctius is driven off the estate. On what day? May we hear this also from 
you? Why are you silent? Tell me the day, I say. He is ashamed to speak it. I under-
stand; but he is ashamed too late, and to no purpose. He is driven off the estate on 
the twenty-third of February, O Caius Aquillius. Two days afterwards, or, even if 
any one had set off and run the moment he left the court, in under three days, he 
accomplishes seven hundred miles
This passage from the Pro Quinctio is a fictional vignette in which Cicero, in his 
speech, conjures up his interrogation of the defendant (notice the representation of a 
spoken, spontaneous structure with the interrogative expression at the end in De saltu 
deicitur Quinctius quo die, for ‘on what day was Quinctius ousted from the estate?’). 
Naevius is made out to be an avid swindler bent on appropriating the claimant’s share 
of the estate by dint of legal subterfuge, Quinctius’ failure to repay a debt. The legal 
argument employed by Cicero in this passage is that Quinctius was ousted from his 
land illegally, because the arbitrator’s ruling could not have reached Narbonensis in less 
than three days. In a manner which must have been all too typical of several courts, es-
pecially when the witness, as in this case, was perceived as a social inferior (Naevius was 
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a praeco, a ‘public crier’), Cicero combines patronizing, polite language (bene ais, ‘thank 
you’) and false agreement (optime) with pressing and intimidating expressions (te ipsum, 
Naeui, uolo audire and later Naeui, te rogo [...] possumus hoc quoque ex te audire?). Also 
interesting is the way in which the interrogating lawyer plays to the audience as he shifts 
from second-person address to Naevius (Te ipsum, Naeui, uolo audire) to treating him as 
a third party in explicitly derogatory terms uolo inauditum facinus ipsius qui id commisit 
uoce conuinci, before resuming cross-questioning in direct address32.
Of course Cicero is not interested in giving a realistic representation of the case, let 
alone reproducing the exact words of the witness. We may have some fragments when, 
in oratorical works, he is narrating a particular exchange in other lawyers’ cases, as in 
(51) and (52):
(51) Cic. De orat. II 285 cum laesisset testis Silus Pisonem, quod se in eum audisse 
dixisset, «potest fieri, - inquit - Sile, ut is, unde te audisse dicis, iratus dixerit». 
Adnuit Silus. «Potest etiam, ut tu non recte intellexeris». Id quoque toto capite 
adnuit, ut se Crasso daret. «Potest etiam fieri - inquit - ut omnino,  quod te 
audisse dicis, numquam audieris». Hoc ita praeter exspectationem accidit, ut 
testem omnium risus obrueret.
Serious damage had been done to the case of a certain Piso by a witness named 
Silus, who had said that he had heard something against him. «It may be the case, 
32 The same technique of a fictional questioning to expose the weakness of the opposing side 
can be found in Pro S. Roscio Amerino, where however the imagined interlocutor is not a witness 
but the main prosecutor, Erucius, treated here as if it was possible to interrogate him: cf. Cic. 
Pro S. Roscio Amerino 52-5 Odium igitur acerrimum patris in filium ex hoc, opinor, ostenditur, 
Eruci, quod hunc ruri esse patiebatur. Numquid est aliud? «Immo uero - inquit - est; nam istum 
exheredare in animo habebat». Audio; nunc dicis aliquid quod ad rem pertineat; nam illa, opi-
nor, tu quoque concedis leuia esse atque inepta: «Conuiuia cum patre non inibat». Quippe, qui 
ne in oppidum quidem nisi perraro ueniret. «Domum suam istum non fere quisquam uocabat». 
Nec mirum, qui neque in urbe uiueret neque reuocaturus esset. Verum haec tu quoque intellegis 
esse nugatoria; illud quod coepimus uideamus, quo certius argumentum odi reperiri nullo modo 
potest. «Exheredare pater filium cogitabat». Mitto quaerere qua de causa; quaero qui scias; [...] 
Exheredare filium uoluit. Quam ob causam? «Nescio». Exheredauitne? «Non». Quis prohibuit? 
«Cogitabat». Cogitabat? cui dixit? «Nemini». Similar also is a passage in Pro Quinto Roscio 
comoedo 8,2 illud uero quod ad rem uehementer pertinet, quaero: quam pridem hoc nomen, Fanni, 
in aduersaria rettulisti? Erubescit, quid respondeat nescit, quid fingat extemplo non habet. Sunt duo 
menses iam, dices. Tamen in codicem accepti et expensi <referri> debuit. Amplius sunt sex menses. 
Cur tam diu iacet hoc nomen in aduersariis? Quid si tandem amplius triennium est? quo modo, 
cum omnes qui tabulas conficiant menstruas paene rationes in tabulas transferant, tu hoc nomen 
triennium amplius in aduersariis iacere pateris?
Rolando FeRRi
- 90 -
Silus, said Crassus, that the person whose remark you say you heard was speak-
ing in anger». Silus nodded assent. «It is also possible that you misunderstood 
him». To this Silus also nodded very emphatic assent, so putting himself into 
Crassus’s hands. «It is also possible, he continued, that what you say you heard 
you never really heard at all». This was so entirely unexpected a turn that the 
witness was overwhelmed by a burst of laughter from the whole court. (transl. 
Sutton, Loeb). 
(52) Cic. De orat. II 265 ut ille Gallus olim testis in Pisonem, cum innumerabilem 
Magio praefecto pecuniam dixisset datam idque Scaurus tenuitate Magi redar-
gueret, «erras, - inquit - Scaure; ego enim Magium non conseruasse dico, sed 
tamquam nudus nuces legeret, in uentre abstulisse».
as when Gallus, who was once a witness against Piso, said that a countless sum 
of money had been given to Magius the governor, and Scaurus tried to confute 
him, by alleging the poverty of Magius, You mistake me, Scaurus, said he, for I do 
not say that Magius has saved it, but that, like a man gathering nuts without his 
clothes, he has put it into his belly (transl. Watson)
In (51) the lawyer lays a trap for the witness: in particular Crassus leads Silus to be-
lieve that they are co-operating, on good terms: they are both extracting the truth from 
the evidence in co-operative manner. This is the direction where Silus is seemingly led 
through a series of acceptable admissions and concessions introduced by potest fieri, down 
to the final aprosdoketon, where Silus is accused a straightforward lying. We may wonder 
why Silus was so accommodating from the start: a hostile witness should have expected 
obstructing behaviour from the opposing counsel, but perhaps Silus was intimidated by 
Crassus’ clout and tried to be friendly as long as it was possible, not realizing that he 
would be made to look ridiculous in the end. In (52) the witness ably retorts to the law-
yer’s attempt to deconstruct his deposition, arguing that the apparent state of Magius was 
one of poverty, not flagrant proof of embezzlement: the witness retorts with a compar-
ison verging on the vulgar, in which the defendant is likened, possibly with a proverbial 
expression, to a man gathering nuts without his clothes and eating all of them because he 
has nowhere to place them, a comparison in which the speaker succeeded in conveying 
various negative innuendos, which were therefore very damaging for the defendant.
Another patent strategy of intimidation is in (53), from the Pro Caecina, although 
the details are not clear. In the civil case of the Pro Caecina, one of the hostile witness-
es cross-questioned by Cicero was an eminent man, although notorious for a previous 
corruption conviction, Fidiculanius Falcula. Cicero reports that he gave the ablest re-
sponse among the other side’s witnesses, because he had understood that the defendant 
for whom he was appearing needed to appear to be acting under provocation, and he 
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said therefore that he had come to the estate with only one or two slaves in attendance. 
Cicero admits that Fidiculanius perceived what would serve the defendant best, but 
he later reports how he had intimidated the witness by reminding him and the jury of 
his unreliability because of the previous corruption conviction. The exact way in which 
Cicero came to phrase this question and exactly why it was relevant to ask Fidiculanius 
how far his land was from the claimant’s is unclear, but we understand that Cicero 
sought the unwitting complicity of the audience, who burst into loud laughter when 
Fidiculanius, asked by Cicero how far his land lay from the claimant’s, answered minus 
quinquaginta milia: in Latin this phrase ambiguously means both ‘less than fifty miles’, 
the intended meaning, and ‘less than fifty thousand’, the latter being the bribe he was 
alleged to have taken and which is said by Cicero to have been what the audience took 
the answer to mean. The exact dynamics of the pun, and especially how came it to be 
that the audience were so ready to grasp at the bait, is unclear, but we clearly see how 
Cicero set about his intimidation and defamation strategy designed to undermine the 
credibility of his antagonist.
(53) Cic. Caecin. 29 ita eum placidum mollemque reddidi, ut non auderet, si-
cut meministis, iterum dicere quot milia fundus suus abesset ab urbe. Nam cum 
dixisset «minus quinquaginta milia», populus cum risu adclamauit ipsa esse. 
Meminerant enim omnes quantum in Albiano iudicio accepisset. 
I made him so tranquil and gentle that he did not dare, as you recollect, to say a 
second time even how many miles his farm was distant from the city. For when 
he had said that it was fifty-three miles away, the people cried out with a laugh, 
that was exactly the distance. For all men recollected how much he had received 
on the trial of Albius.
Cicero then goes to relate a sudden change of mind of this witness, who, he concedes, 
was an experienced old rascal and knew what would be against his friend, but failed to 
pay attention to what had been said before him, thus ending up by weakening his depo-
sition. This was no doubt because he was absent-minded, projecting hs thoughts onto 
some other perjury or some other bribe to get:
(54) Cic. Caecin. 30 Verum tamen is testis, - ut facile intellegeretis eum non adfuisse 
animo, cum causa ab illis ageretur testesque dicerent, sed tantisper de aliquo reo 
cogitasse - cum omnes ante eum dixissent testes armatos cum Aebutio fuisse 
compluris, solus dixit non fuisse. Visus est mihi primo ueterator intellegere praeclare 
quid causae obstaret, et tantum modo errare, quod omnis testis infirmaret qui ante 
eum dixissent: cum subito, ecce idem qui solet, duos solos seruos armatos fuisse dixit.
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A typical strategy of intimidation set in motion by lawyers and judges (when presid-
ing over questioning) is that of rephrasing the same questions33. 
In the Gesta we have the continuous transcript in which a witness is seen to be made 
to waver in his deposition. Victor, the grammarian, at first does not want to incrim-
inate Silvanus, the bishop, charged with several different crimes from traditio (deliv-
ery of ecclesiastical property under duress during a pagan persecution, which was, for 
a member of the clergy, dishonourable at the very least), to bribery and appropriation 
of Church property and embezzlement of goods destined to be distributed among the 
poor. However, a very pressing interrogation slowly makes him change his version: 
(55) Gesta apud Zenophilum, p. 185, 24 ss. Ziwsa: Zenophilus u. c. consularis dixit: 
Siluano communicas. Victor respondit: Ipsi. [...] Et adiecit: Asseueratur praeterea te 
aliud certissime scire, quod Siluanus traditor sit, de eo confitere. Victor respondit: 
Hoc nescio. [...] Nundinarius diaconus dixit: Scit ipse, nam tradidit codices. Victor 
respondit: Fugeram hanc tempestatem; et, si mentior, peream. [...] Cum absens es-
sem, ascensum est a magistratibus, et sublati sunt codices mei. Cum ego uenissem, 
inueni codices sublatos. Nundinarius diaconus dixit: Tu ergo respondisti apud acta, 
quoniam dedisti codices. Quare negantur haec quae prodi possunt?... Zenophilus 
u. c. consularis dixit: Et actis et litteris quae recitatae sunt traditorem constat esse 
Siluanum; et Victori dixit: Simpliciter confitere utrum scias eum aliquid tradidisse. 
Victor dixit: Tradidit, sed non me praesente... Zenophilus u. c. consularis Victori 
dixit: Dictum est a populo, Siluanus traditor? Victor dixit: Ego ipse luctatus sum 
episcopus. Zenophilus u. c. consularis Victori dixit: Ergo sciebas traditorem? De hoc 
confitere. Victor respondit: Traditor fuit.
Are you in contact with Silvanus? Victor: I am [...] and Zenophilus added: it is 
maintained moreover that you know very well that Silvanus has handed in-con-
firm this. Victor answered: I don’t know this. [...] Nundinarius the church dean 
said: He does know this: indeed he himself handed in some books. Victor replied: 
I fled at the time- may I die if this is a lie [...] when I was away, the officers came up 
to the house and my books were taken away. When I came back I found that the 
books had been taken away. Nundinarius the church dean said: But you deposed 
in the record that you gave those books. Why are the facts denied: they can be 
proved... Zenophilus: both the public records and the documents that have been 
read before you show that Silvanus surrendered church property and, to Victor: 
Just declare if you know that he surrendered something. Victor: He did, but not 
in my presence.
A feature of Zenophilus’ questioning is repetition and rephrasing of questions, 
both with Victor, who is patently loath to admit to Silvanus’ guilt at the start, and 
33 Modern examples in Gibbons 2003, 217.
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with a series of non hostile witnesses, in this case to make them state the point clearly 
for the record.
(56) Gesta apud Zenophilum, p. 193, 15-23 Ziwsa: Zenophilus u. c. consularis 
dixit Victori: «Licet iam constiterit ex responsione eorum qui supra sunt inter-
rogati, tamen tu confitere utrum Siluanus traditor sit». Victor dixit: «Secundo 
petito quomodo hoc dimisit ut duceremur ad Carthaginem, ore ipsius episcopi 
audiui: “data est mihi lucerna argentea, et capitulata argentea, et has tradidi”». 
Zenophilus u. c. Victori Samsurici dixit: «A quo audisti?». Victor dixit: «A 
Siluano episcopo». Zenophilus u. c. consularis Victori dixit: «Ab ipso audisti 
quod tradidisset?» Victor dixit: «Ab ipso audiui quod suis manibus tradidis-
set illas». 
Zenophilus said to Victor: «Although it has now become certain from the replies 
of those whom we have already questioned, nevertheless, do you tell us whether 
Silvanus is a Betrayer». Victor said: «When it was demanded a second time how it 
was that he dismissed this matter that we should be led to Carthage, I heard from 
the mouth of the Bishop himself: “I was given a silver lamp and a silver casket, and 
these I gave up”». Zenophilus said to Victor of Samsuricum: «From whom did you 
hear that?». Victor said: «From Silvanus the Bishop». Zenophilus said to Victor: 
«Did you hear from himself that he had been a Betrayer?». Victor said: «I heard 
him say that he gave up these things with his own hands».
(57) Gesta apud Zenophilum, p. 194, 1-5 Ziwsa: Nundinarius dixit: «Viginti 
folles dedit, et factus est presbyter Victor?». Saturninus dixit. Et cum diceret, 
Zenophilus u. c. consularis Saturnino dixit: «Cui dedit?». Saturninus dixit: 
«Siluano episcopo». Zenophilus u. c. consularis Saturnino dixit: «Ergo, ut fieret 
presbyter, Siluano episcopo uiginti folles praemium dedit?» Saturninus dixit: 
«Dedit». 
Nundinarius said: «Did Victor give twenty pieces of money and was he made a 
priest?». Saturninus said:  «Yes.» And when he had said this, Zenophilus said to 
Saturninus: «To whom did he give the money?». Saturninus said: «To Silvanus 
the Bishop». Zenophilus said to Saturninus: «Then he gave twenty pieces of 
money as a bribe to Silvanus the Bishop, that he might be made a priest?». 
Saturninus said: «Yes».
(58) Gesta apud Zenophilum, p. 196, 26-37; p. 197, ll. 1-7 Ziwsa: Zenophilus 
u. c. consularis Crescentiano dixit: «Ex quadringentis follibus quos Lucilla 
donauit, populus aliquid accepit?». Crescentianus dixit: «Nihil inde nemo 
accepit, nescio, nec quis illos erogauerit». Nundinarius dixit: «Aniculae num-
quam inde aliquid acceperunt?». Crescentianus dixit: «Nihil». Zenophilus u. 
c. consularis dixit: «Certe quotiens aliquid tale donatur, omnes inde populares 
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publice accipiunt». Crescentianus dixit: «Non audiui uel uidi dedisse illum ali-
quos». Zenophilus u. c. consularis Crescentiano dixit: «Nihil ergo datum est de 
quadringentis follibus populo?». Crescentianus dixit: «Nihil». Vtique peruenis-
set aliqua partiuncula ad nos. Zenophilus u. c. consularis dixit: «Quo ergo sublati 
sunt?». Crescentianus dixit: «Nescio. Nemo nihil accepit». Nundinarius dixit: 
«Victor quot folles dedit ut fieret presbyter?». Crescentianus dixit: «Vidi allatos 
cophinos cum pecunia». Zenophilus u. c. consularis Crescentiano dixit: Cui dati 
sunt cophini?». Crescentianus dixit: «Episcopo Siluano». Zenophilus u. c. con-
sularis dixit: «Siluano dati sunt?». Crescentianus dixit: «Siluano. Zenophilus u. 
c. consularis dixit: Populo nihil datum est?». Respondit: «Nihil. Necesse est ut 
et nos aliquid acciperemus, si distribuerentur sicut solet».
Zenophilus said to Crescentianus: «Did the people get any of the four hun-
dred pieces of money, the gift of Lucilla?». Crescentianus said: «No one to my 
knowledge had any of it, nor do I know who spent the money». Nundinarius 
said: «Did no old women ever get any of it?». Crescentianus said:  «No». 
Zenophilus said: «It is certain that whenever any gift of this kind is made, 
all the populace receive their part of it in public». Crescentianus said: «I 
neither heard nor saw that he gave any». Zenophilus said to Crescentianus: 
«None then of the four hundred pieces of money were given to the people?». 
Crescentianus said: «None otherwise surely some small trifle would have come 
to us». Zenophilus said: «Where then was the money taken?». Crescentianus 
said: «I do not know. No one got anything». Nundinarius said: «How much 
money did Victor give to be made priest?». Crescentianus said: «I saw that 
he brought baskets with money in them». Zenophilus said to Crescentianus: 
«To whom were the baskets given?». Crescentianus said: «To Silvanus the 
Bishop». Zenophilus said: «Were they given to Silvanus?». Crescentianus 
said: «Yes, to Silvanus». Zenophilus said: «Was nothing given to the peo-
ple?». He answered: «Nothing. We too would necessarily have received some-
thing if the distribution had been made in the usual manner». 
Of the witnesses called by Zenophilus in the late-antique Gesta as he investigates the 
charge of simony against bishop Silvanus, Victor ‘the grammmarian’ is the most articulate, 
and makes some feeble attempt to nuance his assertion, for example when Zenophilus asks 
him to identify responsibilities for the divisions and tensions between local Christians:
(59) Gesta apud Zenophilum, p. 185, 14-23 Ziwsa: «Memor fidei et honestatis 
tuae simpliciter designa quae causa fuerit dissensionis inter Christianos». Victor 
dixit: «Ego dissensionis originem nescio: unus sum de populo Christianorum. 
Siquidem cum essem apud Carthaginem, Secundus episcopus cum Carthaginem 
tandem aliquando uenisset, dicuntur inuenisse Caecilianum episcopum nescio 
quibus non recte constitutum, illi contra alium instituerunt. Inde illic apud 
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Carthaginem coepta dissensio est; et inde originem scire dissensionis plene non 
possum, quoniam semper ciuitas nostra unam Ecclesiam habet, et si habuit dis-
sensionem, nescimus omnino».
Zenophilus said: «Be mindful of your honour and character, and tell me with 
simplicity what was the cause of the dissension amongst Christians?». Victor 
said: «I do not know the origin of the dissension. I am one of the Christian peo-
ple. However, when I lived at Carthage and the Bishop Secundus  had at length 
arrived there, they are said to have discovered that Caecilian had been wrongfully 
made a Bishop, by whom I know not; and they set up another in opposition. 
From that time forward the dissension at Carthage began, but I cannot know its 
origin fully, for our city has always had one church, and if dissension there was, 
we know nothing about it».
Victor answers the question using a different word, originem rather than causam, 
in which responsibility seems to be shifted onto some indefinite agent. Even the rest of 
his deposition is vague, without a clear direction, and non-committal when it comes to 
identifying the initiators of any action: dicuntur... nescio quibus constitutum.
Without giving the exact words, a description of another witness trying to evade a 
question comes from Cicero’s first oration de praetura urbana where Cicero describes 
the deposition of Lucius Domitius
(60) Cic. Verr. II 1,139 cum hoc, ut dico, sciret L. Domitius, me scire ad eum res 
omnis Mustium solitum esse deferre, tamen de Chelidone reticuit quoad potuit, 
alio responsionem suam deriuauit. Tantus in adulescente clarissimo ac principe  
iuuentutis pudor fuit ut aliquam diu, cum a me premeretur, omnia potius respon-
deret quam Chelidonem nominaret; primo necessarios istius ad eum adlegatos 
esse dicebat, deinde aliquando coactus Chelidonem nominauit. 
A blatant case of evasion and reticence is Ingentius’s answer ubi? in the follow-
ing extract. By modern standards, however, both the questioning and the answering 
are flawed. The judge asks leading questions (quis te misit), whereby it is already 
assumed that Ingentius has been set up to something by somebody else (a sort of 
presumption of guilt). 
(61) Acta purgationis Felicis, p. 201, 15-24 Ziwsa: Et astante Ingentio Aelianus 
proconsul dixit: «Cuius praecepto ea suscepisti agenda, quae tibi obiciuntur?». 
Ingentius dixit: «Vbi?». Aelianus proconsul dixit: «Quoniam fingis te non intel-
ligere quod interrogaris, dicam apertius: Quis te ad magistratum Caecilianum mi-
sit?». Ingentius dixit: «Nemo me misit». Aelianus proconsul dixit: «Quomodo 
ergo uenisti ad magistratum Caecilianum?».
Rolando FeRRi
- 96 -
Ingentius skirts around by taking a long detour to a trial of one Maurus, charged with 
simony, but a long-standing friend from the times of the great persecution. Bishop Felix 
of Autumnae had been a prosecutor, and Ingentius claims to have gone, alongside three 
Elders, to Felix’s hometown to seek evidence to substantiate the rumoured charges of 
traditio against Felix. It is at this point that his accuser, Apronianus, interrupts to point 
out that Ingentius is omitting to relate his visit to Caecilianus the city magistrate, pre-
tending to bring a message from Felix. 
(62) Acta purgationis Felicis, p. 201, 15-24 Ziwsa: Ingentius dixit: «Cum uenis-
semus, et ageretur causa Mauri ab Vtica episcopi, qui episcopatum sibi redemit, ad 
urbem ascendit Autumnitanus episcopus Felix, ut tractaret, et dixit, ‘Nemo com-
municet, quia falsum admisit’». Et dixi illi ego e contra: «Nec tibi, nec illi, qui 
traditor es». Dolui enim causam Mauri hospitis mei, quia communicaueram cum 
illo in peregre, quia euasi persecutionem. Exinde iui in patriam ipsius Felicis, duxi 
mecum tres seniores, ut uiderent an uerum tradidisset, an non. Apronianus dixit: 
«Non ita uenit ad Caecilianum quaerere de Caeciliano». Aelianus proconsul 
Caeciliano dixit: «Quomodo ad te uenit Ingentius?». Caecilianus respondit...
Caecilianus gives two different versions of his encounter with Ingentius. In the first 
version Ingentius simply inquires about whether the books were burned, but he is sent 
packing and comes back with Augentius, who relates Felix’s alleged request to write a 
statement that certain books were burned; in the second answer, Ingentius is reported to 
have voiced Felix’s request directly. However, Caecilianus is not called to task about this 
apparent inaccuracy, but the passage is noteworthy for manner of the deposition, which 
seems to have preserved the literal wording of the speaker:
(63) Acta purgationis Felicis, p. 201-2, 24-35, 1-4 Ziwsa: Caecilianus respondit: «domi 
ad me uenit, prandebam cum operarios, uenit illuc, stetit in ianua». «Caecilianus 
ubi est», dixit. Respondi: «hic» ego dico ei: «quid est? Omnia recte?» «omnia» 
dicit. Respondi illi: «si non fastidis prandere, ueni, prande». Dicit mihi: «reuertor 
huc». Venit illuc solus. Dicere mihi coepit, ecce sic mihi curare et inquirere an adusta 
fuerit scriptura anno duouiratus mei. Dico illi ego: «molestus es mihi, tu homo 
immissus es, laxa hinc te a me». Et spreui illum a me. Et uenit illo iterato cum collega 
meo, cum quo fui aedilis. Ait mihi collega meus: «Felix noster episcopus misit huc 
hominem, ut facias illi litteras, quia accepit codices pretiosos, et noluit revocare illos: 
scribas illo, quod anno duumuiratus tui combusti sunt». Et dixi ego: «Haec est fides 
Christianorum?» Ingentius dixit: «Domine, veniat et Augentius. Et ego honorificus 
sum, et honor meus pereat, et huius litteras habemus»34.
34 et honor meus pereat, et huius latera habemus should probably be altered to et honor meus 
pereat, ut huius litteras habemus, on the pattern of asseverative sentences such as ita uiuam ut.
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He came to me at home. I was at dinner with the workmen. He came in and stood 
in the doorway. «Where is Caecilianus?» said he. I answered «Here». I said to 
him «What is it? Is everything all right?». «Everything», said he. I answered 
him «If you feel like it, come and have dinner with us». He said to me «I am 
coming back». He came alone. He began to speak, and there he is asking me if 
the Scriptures had been burnt in the year when I was Duovir. I said to him «You 
annoy me. You are a man who has been suborned. Be off with you. Take yourself 
away from me». And I spurned him from me. And he came yet a second time to-
gether with my colleague with whom I had been aedile. My colleague said to me 
«Felix, our Bishop, sent this man here that you might give him a letter, because he 
has received precious codices, and is unwilling to give them back. Write for him 
that they were burnt in the year when you were Duovir». And I said «Is this the 
faith of Christians?». Ingentius said: «My lord, let Augentius also be called, for 
I too have held honourable office, and it will be all over with my honour, and we 
hold written evidence from him».
The translation is tentative: many passages are probably corrupt in the MS, but no-
tarii had probably great difficulties coping with and trying to transcribe spoken deposi-
tions which they perceived to be ungrammatical (here see especially the transition from 
dicere mihi coepit to ecce sic mihi curare). The passage is however a vivid testimony of 
the linguistic vivacity of court records such as this, and their importance for study in a 
linguistic perspective.
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